


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THESIS

TURKEY'S SECURITY POLICY AND NATO

by

Cahit Armagan Dilek

June, 1992

Advisor:

Roger D. Evered

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**TURKEY'S SECURITY POLICY AND NATO**

**by**

**Cahit Armagan Dilek  
LTJG, Turkish Navy  
B.S., Turkish Naval Academy, 1986**

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
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
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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

This research provides a study about the changing interaction of a Treaty Organization with one of its members. It describes how a member (Turkey) of the organization (NATO) rethinks its relationship with the security alliance so as to adapt to its new environment and make the necessary adjustments in its strategy. It discusses a current issue in the context of strategic management. In order to make the appropriate adjustments, past and present threats, opportunities, advantages and disadvantages are identified. The principles of strategy formulation (internal and external assessments) and evaluation (consistency, consonance, advantage, feasibility) are utilized in this analysis. Finally, the future prospects for Turkey's security policy and NATO are discussed.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. BACKGROUND**

NATO was founded in 1949 as an organization which formed an integrated defense against potential Soviet threats in Europe. This was seen as a clear and present danger that vitally affected the interests of the U.S. and Canada, as well as the nations of Western Europe.

After World War II, Soviet's territorial demands over Turkey, also forced Turkey to seek a reliable security policy. At this time, Turkish leaders saw NATO as the best alternative. In 1952, Turkey became a NATO member and this decision has shaped Turkey's security policy ever since.

The formation of the NATO Alliance created an unprecedented degree of peace time political cooperation among its members that helped deter Soviet efforts to divide and weaken the Western nations. While NATO's military strength has grown enormously over the past 40 years, so has that of the Warsaw Pact. From the outset, it was recognized that NATO required not only military strength but political cohesion if it was to resist the pressures from the East to divide and weaken its members. As a result, there has been a continuing effort to achieve agreement and to state a common position on major issues affecting Alliance security. Between 1945-1991, there wasn't any war in Europe and this was a success for NATO.

During the past forty years, Turkey, a small power which has to exist alongside a global power--Soviet Union, was in control of the strategic Turkish Straits and thereby in a geographical position to hold a great power "by the throat," as Stalin put it.<sup>1</sup> Turkey's formal association with U.S. automatically increased the risk of involvement in an East-West confrontation. On the other hand, cancellation of that association would not automatically eliminate the risk for Turkey. When we look at the past events, we can see that Turkey, with the second largest armed forces in NATO, was evaluated as sometimes a good ally, but sometimes she was a forgotten ally.

From the vantage point of 1992, we can see that many things have changed in the past forty years. Especially after Gorbachev became the president of the U.S.S.R., significant developments occurred in Warsaw Pact countries. At the end of 1991, the U.S.S.R was dissolved. Old Soviet Republics declared their independence. There are many attempts towards democracy in ex-Warsaw Pact countries and new independent countries. These developments lessened the tensions between East and West, and seemed to reduce the risk of war in Europe.

However, regional conflicts all over the world, such as Middle East, Balkans, Central and Southeast Asia, are threatening the world peace. These events have important effects on current world politics. All countries are making their military,

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<sup>1</sup> Vali, Ferenc A., *The Turkish Straits and NATO*, 1972.

economical and political decisions and preferences accordingly; and these decisions and preferences will determine the "New World Order."

Therefore, NATO as an organization and each NATO member must seek new arrangements and policies, because NATO's and members' own policies must be adjusted to new developments. So, while NATO is dealing with its internal problems, it also determines new strategies which will be suitable for itself and its members' own securities. Western NATO members, which are also European Community members, are looking for a new integration in Europe that will include the defense of Europe. They are not eager to follow the U.S. lead. They perceive their interest differently on issues such as detente, Southeast and Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Balkans and Middle East.

Turkey, as a NATO member and as a country which lies between Asia and Europe, between the Muslim Middle East and Christian West, between the ex-Soviet Union and so-called free-world, must adjust her security policy to the new environment. Turkey's geopolitical position, is very close to the potential regional conflicts which seem likely to occur in the Middle East, Central Asia, or Balkans. Hence, she may serve as a buffer or a bridge among a number of contemporary power centers. Moreover, this area has been of the central importance throughout recorded history and has been the central scene of almost continuous cross cultural communication and conflict. This is another point that makes Turkey important in world politics.

On the other hand, the domestic situation in Turkey is very different from the situation in 1950s, when the defense ties with the West were established. Needs, values and opinions have diversified and multiplied. The socio-economic demands of a politically emancipated population that has enjoyed democracy almost consistently for more than four decades have made development its primary goals. This has led to defense having to compete with other requirements for its allocation of national resources. All these developments make the security question tough for Turkey. Turkish leadership must take into account many internal and external factors to make the appropriate decision.

## B. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As we see, new political, economical and military environments require new strategies for NATO and Turkey. Both NATO and its member countries must evaluate the old policies and determine new advantages, disadvantages, threats and opportunities, because it is not clear that old strategies are suitable to new environment.

Therefore, in the following pages of this study, the primary research question will be the following: as a result of these changing political, economical and military environments, how would the leadership of Turkey decide whether Turkey should stay in NATO or not?

To address this question, some subsidiary questions must first be addressed. The followings are these subsidiary questions:

- Why did Turkey join NATO?
- How did the membership of Turkey affect Turkey and NATO?
- When we look at the current environment, where does the primary threat to Turkey come from now?
- Is it also the same for NATO?
- When we consider all these developments and other available security policies, is it still advantageous for Turkey to be a NATO member?

### C. METHODOLOGY

The primary source material will consist of literature reviews to answer these questions. The literature reviews include reports, articles in magazines and newspapers and books published about the relevant topics.

Using these literature reviews, I analyzed the political, economical and military environment in 1950s and examined why Turkey joined NATO. After this I made a comparison with the current environment. Finally I explored how the new security policy must be determined and which alternatives can be selected.

To do this, since Turkey's entry to NATO was a strategic decision, I use the principles of strategy evaluation.<sup>2</sup> So the four principles, *Consistency*, *Consonance*, *Advantage*, and *Feasibility* will be applied to the Turkey-NATO relations in order to find out whether Turkey should stay in NATO or not. Figure 1 will be our frame in this analysis.

---

<sup>2</sup> Mintzberg, Henry, and Quinn, James B., *The Strategy Process (Concepts, Contexts, Cases)*, 1991.

## **II. WHY DID TURKEY JOIN NATO?**

Turkey's entry to NATO was a strategic decision and at that time it was a suitable strategy for Turkey, according to the Turkish leaders who made this decision. It is better to analyze this situation in a historical perspective and identify the opportunities and risks in Turkey's environment during this period to answer the question, "What brought Turkey into alliance with West," or, "Why did Turkey join NATO?"

### **A. BEFORE 1945**

Neutralism was the major feature of Turkish foreign policy in the formative years of the 1920s and 1930s. Though never systematically defined, it implied a commitment to correct diplomatic relations with European powers, non-involvement in the affairs of Europe, friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., and peaceful relations with other neighbors.

At the root of this attitude lay the experience of the War of Independence between 1919-22, which was formative for foreign policy. This was not simply a struggle against territorial occupation and dismemberment by Britain, France, Italy and Greece; politically and economically, it had an anti-imperialist thrust. From the organizational change perspective, it was the result of the interactions between an organization (Turkish State) and its environment. The environment of an

organization is the pattern of all the external conditions and influences that affect its life and development. The environmental influences can be technological, economic, physical, social, military, and political. And organizations interact with and/or react against these influences. This is why Turkey preferred neutralism during this period.

As a result, distance and reserve continued to dominate Turkish relations with the West for many years, while the anti-imperialist nature of Leninist foreign policy and Soviet support for the War of Independence contributed to the maintenance of warmer relations with the Soviet Union.

Turkey's internal situation also affects its strategic decisions. After the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, you see Turkey as a country which was small, economically weak, and militarily exhausted. So the leadership of Turkey gave the priority to internal reconstruction, including Ataturk's radical social reforms. This has required a quiet foreign policy that excluded alliances and external commitments of any kind, hence the choice of neutrality.

But Turkish leaders were aware of a risk which would stem from the neutralism, namely "isolation." To avoid isolation, Turkey improved diplomatic relations with all major powers and gave particular attention to the need to build friendly relations with neighbors. For example, there was a period of friendship between Turkey and Greece during the Ataturk and Venizelos leaderships.

Relations with the Soviet Union occupied a special place. The Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression in 1925, and the assurance of Soviet friendship,

though it lost some of its original glow in the late 1930s, was one of the main planks of Turkish foreign policy. For example, the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, came about largely because the Soviet Union supported Turkey's request for an international conference on the Straits. Turkey also accepted Soviet technical and economic assistance in the 1930s, in marked contrast to her general reluctance to accept foreign assistance from European powers.

This special relationship was a unique development, considering the history of suspicion and war between Russia and Ottoman Empire. However, during this period, the U.S.S.R.'s contractual obligations and generally friendly relations between the two countries reassured Turkey that there would be no reversion to the Czarist policy of expansion at her expense. Her major military antagonist of the past two centuries began to shed its traditional image.

Departures from Turkish neutralism occurred in the late 1930s and led to a cooling of Soviet relations. Not only had the success of modernization along Western lines strengthened the power of the political and economic elite who feared Communism and tended to favor a pro-Western foreign policy, but the external environment looked more threatening because of the rise of Mussolini and Hitler. Her self-imposed isolation from European affairs became difficult to sustain in the face of the rising interest of Mussolini in the Mediterranean and Hitler in the Balkans.

This changing and threatening environment led Turkey to make new friends in international arena. Turkey concluded a Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain which

was ratified in October 1939, after the disclosure of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of August of 1939. Soviet foreign policy seemed concerned to accommodate Germany, and Turkish-Soviet relations went through their coldest stage in twenty years. It seemed that Soviet's foreign policy was also affected from her internal situation. She seemed to solve her internal problems stemming from the 1917 revolution, and to try to gain power by way of some non-aggression agreements.

Before the World War II, the United States was another big country in international arena. But as a general rule, the U.S. considered Turkey to lie in the British sphere of interests. So, the U.S. wasn't really concerned with Turkey until the end of the World War II.<sup>3</sup>

As we see, before the World War II, Turkey had followed generally a flexible and cautious policy of balanced power and neutralism fitting the needs of a new state in search of internal reform and regime consolidation. The formula was simple and became a major principle of Ataturk's policies, "...peace at home and peace in the world." Translated to practical policies, this meant the cultivation of friendly relations with important neighboring states in the Balkan peninsula; rapprochement and friendship with the newly born Soviet revolutionary regime; and resumption of friendly relations with Germany, which could also serve to balance and ameliorate the relationship of Turkey with the traditional mobile power in Mediterranean, Great Britain.

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<sup>3</sup> Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

Turkey had managed to retain its neutrality throughout World War II, walking the diplomatic tightrope between the Scylla of German military control of continental Europe and the Balkans and the Charybdis of British naval primacy in the Mediterranean.<sup>4</sup> And this policy prevented the destruction of Turkey.

#### B. AFTER 1945

The outcome of World War II drastically changed the picture in the world. Prior to war, the U.S. and Soviet Union were two big countries amidst several large powers. In the post war era, we see that these two countries "Super Powers", amidst a world of exhausted lesser powers. While the U.S., for its part, was still vacillating between isolationism and involvement, the Soviet Union, emerging victorious, showed definite expansionist tendencies in its attempt to create a *cordon-santitaire* in its Eastern European "soft underbelly".<sup>5</sup> Germany was defeated soundly and divided into East and West sectors. Britain, also a victorious nation, had, nonetheless, been dealt a severe body blow by the war.

Actually, moving with their prewar Great Power momentum, it was Churchill and Stalin who haggled initially over the details of the post war geopolitical map in Europe. In a series of formal and informal exchanges between November 1943 and July 1945 (Tehran, Moscow, Yalta, Potsdam), the two leaders sought to divide

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<sup>4</sup> Weber, Frank, *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*, 1979.

<sup>5</sup> Couloumbis, Theodore, *The U.S., Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*, 1983.

Europe into spheres of influence. But this situation was not to last long, for one of the central by products of World War II was the center of gravity of global power moved away from the center of European continent and toward peripheral powers that had played lesser roles in the 19th century--the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

World War II caused Europe to be destroyed. Western European countries were in need of political, economic and military aid. Soviet regime was a threat to these countries. Since the Eastern European countries were under the influence of this regime, the other super power, the U.S. felt that she has to protect Western Europe against the Soviet expansionism. This was necessary to protect both the U.S. and Western Europe's interests. The U.S. government formulated and coordinated a strategy for the defense of Western Europe. According to this strategy, the U.S. would provide for the necessary military equipments, and West European countries would transfer their resources to their economic developments rather than investing in military. In other words, the U.S. would support these countries in political, economic and military area.

These developments were the beginning of "cold war" and "loose bipolar system" in international relations due to the different ideologies of two super power.

Even though Turkey managed to remain neutral until the closing days of war, in spite of the pressures of fighting countries, post war era situation in Turkey was not different than in Western Europe. Turkey's economy, despite structural

imbalances, did not seem faced with immediate crisis.<sup>6</sup> But her growth rate was zero and needed foreign support for her economic developments.

During the war, Turkey amassed a reserve of some \$270 million in gold and foreign exchange, though at the price of running down its already inadequate industry. This amount was sufficient to defray the costs of imports for more than a year; in the meantime most foreign observers expected Turkish exports to Europe to rise rapidly. Moreover, the new Turkish government had, in September 1946, undertaken a substantial devaluation to bring the value of its currency into line with the views of the International Monetary Fund. Economic liberalization became the order of the day; a strong current began to flow against the hostility to private enterprise that had characterized the previous decade.

Essentially this movement represented a reaction against the failure of the earlier experiment to provide a self-sufficient economic base and the restiveness of Turkey's growing entrepreneurs with wartime restrictions. The sudden relaxation of controls afforded momentary relief to business interests, and provided the possibility of windfall profits as well, giving to the Turkish authorities and Western observers an initial if short-lived surge of confidence. Although these measures soon proved to be the wrong prescription for healthy development, at the end of 1946 Turkey's economic prognosis appeared satisfactory.

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<sup>6</sup> USFR, 1946.

Turkey's domestic political situation was also different than its pre-war situation. During this period, Turkey was experiencing a multi-party system and there were attempts to complete her democratic institutionalization. But she needed external support in these endeavors. Of course only democratic countries, such as U.S and Western European countries, could provide this kind of support.

At this time, Turkish Armed Forces was not effective. This was one of the reasons that led Turkish leaders not to involve in the war. Since the end of the war the Turkish Armed Forces had remained woefully antiquated, some of their munitions dating from the First World War. They lacked mobility; even the advantage of interior lines of communication was largely offset by the poor state of the transportation network. Turkish officials were looking for solutions to bring up the Turkish Armed Forces "up to strength".

While Turkey had hard times with her internal affairs, the external conditions were also worsening. In addition to internal and external developments explained above, when Soviet victories over Germany established and the U.S.S.R. emerged as unchallenged power in Eastern Europe, the Turkish suspicion had turned to fear. Actually, the core issue was evident even in 1939. Conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, gave concrete evidence that the Kremlin had not abandoned the traditional Russian ambition to control the Turkish Straits.

It was at this time of shifting power and uncertainty of transition at the regional and global settings that the Soviets raised a number of revisionist demands with respect to the status of the straits and Turkey's eastern provinces of Kars and

Ardahan bordering on the Soviet Union. By 1945 it had become quite clear to Turkish officials that the Soviet objective was to revise the regime of the Straits in favor of Soviet interests--specifically moving away from exclusive Turkish sovereignty to an arrangement of joint Soviet-Turkish control responsibilities over the Straits.

The first Soviet move to test the Turkish issue came on March 19, 1945, when Molotov gave notice of Soviet intention to denounce the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Turkey. On June 7, 1945, the Kremlin has advanced another demand, far more alarming than the first. Now, Moscow was demanding a base on the Straits, and a border rectifications in the eastern part of Turkey, as the price of renewing the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. This prospect surely sent shivers and chills down the Turkish spine. In reaction, the Turkish diplomatic machine was cranked into higher gear.<sup>7</sup>

As can be seen, on the following days of World War II, when we consider the external and internal affairs, Turkey has faced three crucial developments which would determine her future policies:

- Soviet's territorial demands
- The necessity of foreign aid for economic development
- The need of external support in establishing the multi-party system and democratic institutions.

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<sup>7</sup> Howard, Harry, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 1975.

### **C. TURKISH EFFORTS TO INVOLVE THE U.S.**

According the Turkish leaders, Soviet threat was the most important problem which was directly related with her security and independence. So, they began to look for the solutions. It became obvious to the Turkish leaders that the British were overextended and tiring fast and that the U.S. had to replace them in the traditional role of mobile global balancer.

Therefore, the Turkish objective became one of securing peacetime U.S. military and diplomatic support for Turkish territorial integrity and the maintenance of the status quo in the Straits. Turkey's geopolitical position was the most important factor that could help Turkey to get the Western support. The U.S. obliged, cautiously at first and enthusiastically later. Sharing Ankara's argument that Turkey's geographic location rendered it a key to the Middle East, the Truman administration demonstrated its backing by dispatching the powerful battleship USS Missouri on a show the flag mission to Istanbul on April 5, 1946.

For the Turks, the image of the U.S. was greatly enhanced by the American performance in the war. Capping it off was the explosion of the atomic bomb, which imparted to the U.S. an aura of invincibility that would not be questioned in Turkey for many years to come. Moreover, the victory of the Allied cause was widely regarded by the Turkish elite as a measure of the superiority of the democratic

system. At the same time, the U.S. was generally depicted by the Turkish press as the defender of right, justice, and humanity.<sup>8</sup>

These images, opportunities, and risks led Turkish leaders to put into effect the efforts to involve the U.S. The Ankara government was successful in its efforts. For example, to cope with the Soviet's territorial demands, the Turkish government stepped up its consultations with the U.S., attempting to dramatize the Soviet threat, arguing that the Kremlin would be deterred not by concessions but by firmness. So, to reinforce her position in the face of these threatening gestures, the Ankara government sought urgently to coordinate its response with those of the U.S. and British governments. The firmness which Washington and London joined the Ankara government in treating the Soviet threats showed its effect after a while.

In the face of tangible diplomatic support from Britain and the U.S., the Soviet Union called off its diplomatic offensive by the end of 1946, and the pressure on Turkey seemed considerably less urgent than it had been during the previous two years.<sup>9</sup>

#### D. TRUMAN DOCTRINE

When we look at the world politics, we see that Turkey and Greece sometimes had the same problems, and so they have dealt with the same issues at the same time. In the spring of 1947, Greece and Turkey were in quite different circumstances.

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<sup>8</sup> Harris, George S. *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

While Turkey was dealing with the problems explained above, the Greek government was in the midst of a stubborn civil war; and its major external supporter, Great Britain, was about to shut off the life-support mechanism.<sup>10</sup> For the politicians in Athens, Western support was not a question of choice, but an imperative for political survival.

Shortly after the British formally informed the U.S. government that they could no longer foot the bill of \$250 million in economic and military support needed to maintain the non-Communist status quo in Greece and Turkey, the U.S. decision making apparatus responded with the historic proclamation of the *Truman Doctrine* on March 12, 1947.

According to the U.S. officials, the communist rebellion in Greece would prove successful without massive American intervention to check it. This, in turn, was expected to place Greece into the Soviet orbit, leading to isolation, encirclement, and potential loss of Turkey for the West.<sup>11</sup>

America's actions to aid and abet the governments of Turkey and Greece were projected as a demonstration of vigilance and resolve in a deadly game of global significance. Turkey and Greece became the demonstration vehicles of America's determination to confront the rise of communism, equated with Soviet expansionism, in any part of the globe beyond the Soviet sphere of influence. The need for

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<sup>10</sup> Couloumbis, Theodore, *The U.S., Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*, 1983.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

declaring a doctrine of resolve to contain the Soviet Union was dramatized by the Greek civil war, which was fast tilting in favor of the Communist guerrillas. Turkey was not considered to be on the danger list. But in the words of a U.S official, Turkey "...was slipped into the oven with Greece because that seemed the surest way to cook a tough bird."<sup>12</sup>

In tangible terms, U.S. military and economic aid soon became the primary lever of U.S. presence and influence in Turkey and Greece. Congress initially authorized \$400 million for aid to both countries.<sup>13</sup>

The international arena is an open system. States and international organizations are the members of this system. Each of them can be affected by the others' decisions and actions. In these relations, economics have an important place. Economic relations can be used to have a political effect on the other members of the system. So, Turkish leaders, being conscious through their history to the pain of offering special privileges to foreigners (for example, the capitulations during the Ottoman Empire), were very sensitive to the implementation of Truman Doctrine. And they insisted that U.S. journalists monitoring aid to projects would be limited in their movements by requirements of Turkey's national security considerations.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, and Assistance from International Organizations*, yearly publications.

<sup>14</sup> Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

In the meantime, the U.S. was undertaking a massive rehabilitation program for Europe under the Marshall Plan. Proclamation of the *Marshall Plan* in June, 1947, faced the Ankara government with the urgent problem of discovering how they might fit into this project. The Marshall Plan was not designed to deal with Turkey's particular situation. With the Truman Doctrine, American planners believed that Turkey's urgent assistance requirements had been met. But Turkish officials insisted on being included in this plan, and the American policy makers proposed only a small role for the Marshall Plan in Turkey.<sup>15</sup> What they believed for Turkey was an allocation of machinery to stimulate production in agricultural goods and minerals. True to the original intent of its designers, the program for Marshall Plan assistance in Turkey concentrated on developing agriculture. And most Turks greeted the Marshall Plan with warm appreciation.<sup>16</sup>

#### E. THE CHALLENGE OF NATO

While the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were contributing to the development of Western Europe, it was, at the same time, a clear signal of Europe being divided into East and West. The Soviet Union saw the European countries as an obstacle against the expansion of its ideology throughout the world. During this period, East Europe was one of the weak points of the Westerns. So the U.S.S.R.

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<sup>15</sup> Helseth, William, *The U.S. and Turkey*, 1962.

<sup>16</sup> Robinson, Richard, *Impact of American Military and Economic Assistance Programs in Turkey*, 1956.

increased its influences on these countries. To prevent the expansion of the Soviet ideology, the U.S. coordinated the "Containment Strategy" under the names of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. According to these plans, freedom of people and independence of the countries will be defended with the military power, if necessary.

By mid-1948 the U.S. had become interested in establishing a formal collective security arrangement for Europe. This was a momentous shift in American policy. Up to this time she had contributed to improve the military power of Western European countries by providing economic aid and military equipment, but the U.S. government had on a number of occasions rejected the idea of engaging in an explicit defensive alliance.

But with the demise of the non-Communist regime in Czechoslovakia and the imposition of the Berlin blockade in 1948, the U.S. stance toward defensive pacts shifted.<sup>17</sup> In March 1948, when England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact for collective defense, the United States announced its support of this arrangement, and by June of that year the U.S. was actively engaged in laying the bases for the NATO.

Finally, *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*, an alliance originally envisaged as restricted exclusively to Western European states, officially came into being in April 1949. NATO members have agreed to coordinate their defense

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<sup>17</sup> Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

planning in peacetime and to assist each other in defending their territory if any member should be attacked. The heart of the treaty is Article V, which declares that an attack on one member will be met by response from all members.<sup>18</sup>

The Ankara government was immediately interested in joining the organization. Because, the Turkish leaders were animated by concern lest Turkey's exclusion lead to a diminution of U.S. interest and consequently to a reduction in American aid which was provided by Truman Doctrine and Marshal Plan. Unquestionably, the size of U.S. assistance had by this time become a central preoccupation in Ankara. Some Turkish leaders also voiced anxiety that the formation of NATO, by barring further Soviet encroachment in Western Europe, might induce the Kremlin to increase pressure on such less firmly protected points as Turkey.<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, Turkey was still dealing to establishing the democratic institutionalization, and still needed external support to accomplish this attempt. According to the Turkish leaders and the public opinion, these developments could be supported only by democratic governments, which are also founders of NATO. Turkey's big goal, being a modernized country which is be at the same level of Western civilization, was another factor that led Turkish government to interested in joining NATO.

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<sup>18</sup> Sloss, Leon, *NATO Reform: Prospects and Priorities*, 1975.

<sup>19</sup> Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

The lure of cooperation with a capitalist giant and the desire to be accepted by the community of Europe have influenced the decision of a generation of officials and interest groups trained in, Western concepts of modernization. So, to join any western organization and to follow a policy which is parallel to Western countries, became an important government objective in Turkey. And generally, the public was supporting this kind of policy.

All these external developments and domestic pressures forced the Turkish leaders to follow diplomatic actions to be involved in NATO. At first, the founders of this organization didn't accept this involvement. The U.S. administration demurred on the grounds that this pact was an Atlantic regional alignment not open purely Mediterranean states. Basically, the U.S. was not prepared to undertake further responsibilities until NATO structure had been firmly established. The opposition from the European members of the alliance, especially the British and Scandinavians, formed the greatest barrier to Turkish admission.<sup>20</sup>

These powers apparently were fearful lest the extension of the pact to non-industrialized and Muslim Turkey would weaken the unity of the European community. Some also seemed concerned that the effort to bring Turkey's military equipment up to the standards set for Europe would entail a reduction in the arms

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<sup>20</sup>

Armstrong, Hamilton, *Eisenhower's Right Flank*, 1951.

they were to receive. These states were also cool to the idea of expanding the NATO treaty to include such clearly non-Atlantic states such as Turkey and Greece.<sup>21</sup>

It was the time of making a strategic decision. The basic point that strategy, ultimately, requires the achievement of fit between the external situation (opportunities and threats) and internal capability (strengths and weaknesses) would be the basis for Turkish leaders. When the Turkish decision makers analyzed the situation then, explained above, and they came up with the following reasons which led them to be a NATO member:

- The necessity of military support against the Soviet Union.
- The big goal of being a European country.
- To ensure the continuity of the economic and politic supports provided by the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.
- To get the support which is needed for democratic developments.<sup>22</sup>

After this analysis, Turkish leaders began series of diplomatic actions. They tried to show how Turkey and Western countries will be affected if Turkey is excluded from NATO. Turkey's strategic position was the most effective factor that Turkish leaders had. At the same time, the Korean war was a good opportunity for Turkey. The heroism of five thousand Turkish troops on Korean battlefields and Turkey's

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<sup>21</sup> Couloumbis, Theodore, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences*, 1966.

<sup>22</sup>Class notes at the Turkish Naval Academy, *Turkey-Super Powers Relations*, 1985.

dedication to democratic progress during an era of paranoid American sensitivity to communism endeared Turkey to the American public.

And finally, in the end of these Turkish diplomatic efforts, on May 15, 1951, Washington proposed to its NATO partners that Turkey and Greece be accepted as full members. The rationale for this decision as leaked to the press was that the Turkish armed forces would fill an otherwise exposed flank, and that with such ties Turkey possibly could be drawn toward a sort of neutralism in view of its common border with the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, not only would Turkey's adherence to the Atlantic Pact impel the Soviet Union to divert additional forces from Eastern Europe, but Turkish air fields would be available for NATO allies.<sup>23</sup> Under this U.S. pressure, other NATO countries weakened their opposition to extending NATO to the eastern Mediterranean. Britain was insisting on a separate Middle East Command under a British general, rather than extending NATO to eastern Mediterranean. Agreement was reached after a compromise was devised to create South European Command under an American general.

As a result, Turkey was able to enter NATO officially on February 18, 1952, as a full-fledged member.

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<sup>23</sup> Sultzberger, C.L., "Atlantic Parley Will Arrive to Bolster Europe's," *New York Times*, September 2, 1951.

### III. TURKEY AND NATO IN THE POSTWAR ERA

#### A. TURKEY'S PLACE IN NATO

Turkey's search for a formal Western commitment was now successfully concluded. The Turks greeted their adherence to NATO with general rejoicing. Even the tiny left wing was either so intimidated or in such disarray that it could not make its voice heard as it had in times past.

Two aspects of the Turkish reaction appeared particularly significant for the future. On the one hand, Turks characteristically regarded NATO as an extension of the U.S. Hence, for example, some editorialists emphasized that "*with the Atlantic Pact, should Turkey now be attacked, America's aid is automatically guaranteed.*" On the other hand, much was made of the recognition of Turkey's equality with West European nations inherent in the agreement to include her in NATO. For the Turks, acceptance by the Atlantic alliance was an act confirming their cherished belief that they were, and should be recognized as, an integral part of Europe.<sup>24</sup>

Joining NATO was not only the gain in physical security from the Soviet Union that was important. From Ankara's point of view, an important advance over previous connections with the West, lay in providing assurance that Turkey would

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<sup>24</sup> Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

continue to receive aid in quantities that could spell the success of the government's ambitious development plans.

Moreover, there was no doubt that Foreign Minister Koprulu expressed the general view when he told the parliament in December 1951: "*Our national interests are identical from every standpoint with the joint interests of the NATO and with its geographic and military requirements.*" In this frame of mind, many Turks, especially those in the governing party (DP), readily assumed that Turks and Americans were intrinsically alike and that Turkey could and should become a "*little America*."

For the U.S. as well the assumption that Turkish-American interests were entirely congruent now became accepted as the basic tenet of the relationship.<sup>25</sup> In consequence, American planners thereafter tended to overestimate U.S. freedom of action in Turkey; they didn't easily foresee the difficulties that would arise from using the alliance for purposes that did not appear to be directly connected with containing the U.S.S.R. Hence, one of the central and enduring problems of the Turkish-American cooperation has been to define the scope of this association, a scope that has demonstrably changed in the years since the alliance first came into being.

It was not clear from the NATO commitment what economic goals the Western Allies and especially the U.S., were expected to meet. The Atlantic alliance implied that Turkey was a Western nation on a par with Europe. This was not true in terms of living standard, education, and the cultural level of the masses. Therefore, the

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<sup>25</sup> George, C. McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1954.

question remained open. What sort of program would the NATO allies undertake in order to build up Turkey to bring this underdeveloped state to the level of their European counterparts? The failure to define aims for Turkey's economic development contributed directly to the contretemps over economic assistance that formed one of the outstanding features of the Turkish-American relations in the next decades.

Once Turkey entered NATO, this connection served as the general foundation for the whole range of political, economic, and military relations between Turkey and the U.S. Previous programs, such as economic assistance extended under the Marshall Plan, and the military aid provided through the Truman Doctrine, were expanded. But in the eyes of both parties, these activities were now considered to be subsumed under NATO. In practice, this meant that both sides recognized these programs to be continuing multi-year engagements with no projected terminal date.

Moreover, the NATO connection led to a proliferation of U.S. activities in Turkey, from an array of special bilateral accords ordering more intimate military cooperation to a fanning out of technical assistance projects to a great variety of areas of Turkish life.

Through NATO membership, Turkey for the first time assumed the obligation to coordinate defense plans with those of a European army under an international command. No longer was the protection of the country a matter for exclusive planning by Ankara; nor was it a function of Turkish forces and their deployment alone. Although Turkish units in peacetime were to remain under their national

commanders, their armaments, doctrine, and organization had to be brought into harmony with the U.S. prepared the base for this. Now, however, other NATO states met regularly to debate issues relative to these matters in a much more intimate way.

While Turkish leaders were enjoying the NATO membership, what were the Allies thinking of? After the initial resistance of some founder members, when Turkey joined NATO, the experience of the Korean war still dominated the thinking of the allies. Fearing imminent Soviet attack on Europe, the alliance partners had set themselves the goal of fielding a conventional defense force of ninety-six divisions, of which some forty were to be operational at all times; and yet, the Western European states had less than twenty divisions at their disposal. Hence, the prospect of adding some eighteen Turkish divisions--even if not on the crucial central front--was a powerful argument for admitting Turkey in the first place. NATO strategy assumed that presence of these forces along the frontier of the Soviet Union would cause the Kremlin to divert significantly effectiveness to defend its Caucasus border, thereby reducing the number of Soviet units that could be committed to attack central Europe.

Moreover, Turkish troops were the least costly to maintain of any in the alliance--a consideration then also commonly cited in justifying U.S. military aid allocations.<sup>26</sup>

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Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

This prospect did not dismay the Turkish leaders. On the contrary, they felt reassured that for their enemies the cost of war had become impossibly high. Moreover, in this era, most of the Turkish elite conceived of the world as essentially bipolar; viewing their fate as inextricably bound up with that of all their allies, they simply could not imagine it possible to remain outside of any conflict that might develop between the U.S.S.R. and the West.

A more important problem for the future, however, lay in another aspect of the military relationship. The NATO agreement was soon complemented by bilateral understandings dealing with specific facets of Turkish-American military cooperation.<sup>27</sup> Some of these understandings were full-fledged agreements, openly published and ratified by the Turkish parliament; for example, the Status of Forces Agreement of June 1954, which provided privileges and immunities for non-diplomatic personnel in the service of the U.S. government. Other understandings took the form of public exchanges of notes indicating agreement on certain procedural questions.

But in addition, there were secret exchanges of notes and executive agreements concerning such matters as the deployment of weapons systems in Turkey and the right of U.S. personnel to carry on activities of a military or intelligence nature. Most

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<sup>27</sup> Class notes at the Turkish Naval Academy, *Turkey-Super Powers Relations*, 1985.

basic of these was the Military Facilities Agreement of June 1954, an understanding concluded in accordance with a Turkish Cabinet meeting.<sup>28</sup>

Under the NATO arrangement, the Americans were the primary element involved in the Turkish military establishment. The other Atlantic Pact allies had little day-to-day contact with Turkish armed forces and furnished relatively little to bolster Turkish capabilities in the beginning of the membership. The European powers were still in the postwar recovery phase and had no significant military surplus to offer Turkey even at a price. In fact, Turkish leaders preferred it that way. Like their NATO associates in general, they saw the U.S. as the essential force to lend credence to the alignment; they also trusted in Washington's disinterest perhaps more than in that of the European. Thus, they ever urged strong U.S. leadership and a prominent role for America in the alliance.

In the specific cases of Turkey and Greece, containment policy aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from gaining control of Europe's flank in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Turkey's admission to NATO was essentially a continuation of this policy, it must be also seen in the context of new international developments. The most important of these was the Korean War, which was viewed in the West as the opening round of a new, aggressive phase in Soviet policy for which Europe

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<sup>28</sup>

Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

could be next possible target. It also showed that the policy of containment was inadequate without the willingness and capability to fight a limited war.<sup>29</sup>

Apprehension about over-extending the Alliance's area of responsibility into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East had been among the reasons for NATO's previous reluctance to admit Turkey, as had social, cultural and economic differences. When the containment strategy was reformulated in the lights of the Korean War experience, so as to draw a clear line around the Soviet Union and support that frontier with strategic air power, the implications of Turkish accession changed. Turkish bases became important, and Turkey helped to complete the frontier from Norway to the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Her consent to participate in a Middle Eastern Command promised to extend the frontier still further in order to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East. The large Turkish army became an asset at a time when strategic thinking assigned a significant deterrent value to local ground forces.<sup>30</sup>

As NATO strategy and defense plans evolved to suit new needs and new circumstances, Turkey's role also changed. NATO began to incorporate tactical and theater nuclear weapons into its strategy between 1954 and 1957. Evidence appearing in the autumn of 1957 that the Soviet Union was advancing towards an ICBM capability increased the U.S.'s sense of vulnerability and led her to deploy Jupiter

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<sup>29</sup> Wolfe, Thomas, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970*, 1970.

<sup>30</sup> Osgood, Robert, *NATO, The Entangling Alliance*, 1962.

and Thor IRBM in Europe as an interim measure, and after the NATO Council meeting in December 1957 Turkey consented to the stationing of the Jupiters on her soil. With the deployment of the Polaris SLBM, these IRBM became obsolete and were withdrawn from Turkey in 1963 but not before the Cuban missile crisis had allowed Khrushchev to tie the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba to the removal of the Jupiters from Turkey.<sup>31</sup> Turkey then appeared very vulnerable both to a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear attack and to a retaliatory strike. During the Cuban crisis, as during the U-2 incident of 1960, the concept of 'hostage Europe' was viewed in Turkey as 'hostage Turkey.'

The advent of a policy of mutual assured destruction in the late 1960s and the attainment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union changed the rules of super power interaction and opened the way for dialogue; containment became much less relevant. And, in the 1960s, NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response. Some have argued that such a strategy would tend to make Turkey less secure, because it might encourage limited moves by the Soviet Union against NATO's less strongly defended flanks in the expectation that the Alliance would not be likely to use nuclear weapons in this eventuality. It was also argued that a limited Soviet aggression of this kind against Turkey might fail to activate NATO. It has been suggested, too, that Turkey could be a target for Soviet nuclear pre-emption because

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Hafner, Donal, *JFK, Cuba and U.S. Missiles in Turkey*, 1977.

the American bases on her territory might tempt the U.S.S.R. to initiate a limited nuclear exchange.<sup>32</sup>

Although the debate on doctrine has somewhat abated, apprehension over Turkey's inability to modernize her conventional capability to meet the requirements of the new strategy has remained. This concern must be seen in the wider context of the continuing assessment among Western strategists that NATO has become relatively more vulnerable on the flanks. Reports to the effect that if the Soviet Union demanded direct lines of access to the Middle East and gave Turkey an ultimatum, the Alliance might urge Turkey to accommodate may approximate to reality, they certainly aggravate Turkish anxiety. It is understandable that NATO has continued to look inward, "hypnotized by the central region," as Sir Peter Hill-Norton has put it, where lies the route to the heartland of NATO. What is not understandable is that again in his words, "it is very hard indeed to persuade even the Council and the Military Committee to give any serious weight, much less due weight, to the Flanks. Does history not show that an aggressor will not always seek chinks in the defender's armor?"

At the same time, the Soviet Union began to acquire global reach. The U.S.S.R. out-flanked Turkey and established her influence in the Middle East and a presence in the Mediterranean. Together, these forward moves enhanced Turkey's value for Western security. The control of the Turkish Straits and Turkish airspace

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Vali, Ferenc A., *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 1971.

have become more critical for the defense of Western interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and they are generally seen as Turkey's major tasks in NATO defense.

The current assessment seemed to be that Turkey remains vital to the security of NATO's southern flank and that, while she is not directly vital to the defense of the central sector, her contribution will be important indirectly, because "if southern flank is not secure, other NATO forces, particularly those in central Europe will be greatly weakened and the defense of the center cannot be separated from the defense of either flank."<sup>33</sup>

NATO strategy for the defense of Turkey relied almost exclusively on the Turkish Armed Forces. Evasiveness in official circles on the subject of reinforcements leads one to assume that Turkey cannot count on them, and in any case facilities for their speedy and orderly reception are limited. The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force was more symbolic in peacetime as a sign of political will to come to the assistance of a threatened NATO member than as a defense force in time of conflict, when it would be too small to make much difference. Turkey's geographical isolation has already made for logistic problems. If NATO assistance is in doubt, it follows that Turkey must try to develop her conventional defense capability in peacetime so as to be able to face any opponent alone in war.

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<sup>33</sup> Collins, John, and Chwat, John Steven, *Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO and the Middle East*, 1975.

## B. CYPRUS: TURKEY VS. NATO

Turkey's relationship with the Alliance was tested by the Cyprus conflict, first in 1964, and again in 1974.

### 1. 1964 Conflict and Johnson's Letter

The persistence of intercommunal armed clashes in Cyprus after December 1963 and the failure of both diplomatic attempts and the UN Force in Cyprus to resolve the situation led Turkey to contemplate military intervention several times in 1964. Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, signed when the Republic of Cyprus was established, permits unilateral action to restore the status quo, if collective action by the guarantor powers--Britain, Greece and Turkey--fails. In June 1964, the U.S. warned Turkey against military action. This warning (known as 'Johnson's letter' in public) forestalled Turkish intervention, but also shook Turkey out of the comfortable feeling of security she had found in NATO, for President Johnson reminded her that:

a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope that you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.

Turkish Prime Minister Inonu replied that:

There exists between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an

obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue of such discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning.<sup>34</sup>

The Cyprus conflict of 1964 marked the turning point in Turkey's foreign policy. This was not simply because of the frustrations she felt when prevented from pursuing a national policy over Cyprus, nor because Greece, an ally, also appeared to pose a threat. More important was the sudden realization that subtle changes were taking place in the interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union that were bound to affect the security relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. The Johnson Letter explicitly told Turkey that neither the security afforded by the Nato under American leadership nor the Soviet threat were unconditional and irreversible proportions. The leader of NATO had explained that she differentiated between the types of Soviet threat and reserved to herself the right to define when and under what conditions the Soviet Union could be a threat to the security of Turkey.

This American re-examination and refinement of the Soviet threat forced a fundamental change in the Turkish view of the security afforded by NATO. Prime Minister Inonu realized that the Cold War was over beyond doubt, and the major theme of his foreign policy statements in subsequent years was constant caution against involvement in the issues between the superpowers. This was a complete reversal for a statesman who was one of the first to come out on the side of the United States during the Cuban missile crisis only two years ago. According to the

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<sup>34</sup> Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

Turkish leaders, the security formula of the cold war years (exclusive reliance on the U.S. and unswerving hostility to the U.S.S.R.) was no longer realistic and could be dangerous for Turkey.

For the next ten years Turkey tried to make readjustments. References to the Soviet policy of peaceful co-existence increased, particularly in unofficial circles. The NATO continued to be the basis of her security policy but it was felt to be essential to enhance Turkey's individual security by dissociating herself somewhat from the global policies of the U.S., by limiting security commitments to NATO and by softening the rigid evaluation of the threat from the Soviet Union. It became a deliberate Turkish objective not to provoke the Soviet Union. Risks in security cooperation came to be weighed against gains. Cancellation of American reconnaissance flights from Turkey over the Soviet Union in 1965, the negotiation with the U.S. of the Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and refusal to allow the use of bases in Turkey for missions during the June 1967 and October 1973 Middle East Wars serve as examples of this new policy.

## 2. 1974 Conflict and U.S. Arms Embargo

The dilemma posed by Cyprus and Greece, which plagued Turkey's alliance relations since 1964, reached a new climax in the summer of 1974. A coup on July by Greek officers of National Guard and the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA-B) overthrew Makarios Government and installed an ex-EOKA terrorist, Nicos Sampson, as President of Cyprus. Turkey feared *enosis*, since the coup appeared to have been encouraged by the military government in Greece.

**She failed to persuade Britain to undertake joint intervention and therefore launched an unilateral offensive, "Cyprus Peace Operation."**

**The UN Security Council Resolution 353 called for a cease fire, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the initiation of negotiations. Two Geneva Conferences were unable to settle peace on the island. Following these failures, a second offensive, launched on 14-17 August in order to consolidate the Turkish foothold. Later, the question of Turkish interests and presence became further bound up with Turkish domestic politics. And in international politics Turkey experienced hard times.**

**The imposition of an arms embargo against Turkey by the U.S. Congress, on the grounds that her use of U.S. supplied weapons during the intervention was a violation of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act, complicated the chances for settlement. On the other hand, the embargo created a strong Turkish desire to resist foreign pressure; on the other, it fostered Greek hopes that Turkey would have to give way to that pressure.**

**The effects of Cyprus conflict, the arms embargo and the Greek-Turkish hostilities brought Turkish-American relations almost to breaking point. Turkey argued that the Cyprus conflict and defense cooperation were separate issues and that curtailing the flow of equipment and spare parts was a hostile act, and moreover, one that undermined her overall defense capability. NATO military officials, including the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Haig, pointed out that the Turkish Armed Forces had lost about half of their effectiveness,**

particularly in the Air Force, and Admiral Shear, then Commander of the South Forces of NATO, agreed that they were suffering in terms of readiness.

As a result of the U.S. arms embargo which was imposed upon Turkey in 1975 and left partially in effect for too many years, the ability of Turkey to carry out its NATO responsibilities was severely compromised. By 1978, the Turkish Armed Forces were operating at less than 50 percent effectiveness; and it was estimated that these forces would be reduced to only 20 percent effectiveness if the embargo was sustained for another two years. After prolonged debate, the Congress voted to lift the embargo on August 2, 1978.<sup>35</sup>

Despite the lifting of the embargo, however, it soon became clear that Turkey was still confronted with substantial problems that impaired its ability to revamp its armed forces and carry out its NATO role. On the other hand, against the background of the arms race with Greece, Turkey now engaged in an ambitious military procurement program, which strained the economy. Turkey's traditional reliance on one source of supply, together with the need to maintain technological continuity, the rudimentary nature of her indigenous arms industry and weakness in the heavy industrial base, created difficulties, as did the scarcity of foreign exchange and her political isolation.

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<sup>35</sup> American Foreign Policy Institute, *NATO Security and the Turkish Economy*, 1979.

The cumulative impact of the arms embargo on Turkish security was profound. *Having once realized how vulnerable her defense capability was to external manipulation, Turkey would never again trust her security to allies in quite the same way.*

Because the arms embargo came at a time of *super power detente*, it could have implied either that the U.S. believed that the U.S.S.R. would not act against Turkey or that it would not act against Turkey or that it would not matter if she did. The embargo could have been interpreted as a signal to the Soviet Union of a reduction of the American commitment to Turkey's defense.

On the other hand, Turkey's initial reserve and watchfulness about super power detente and its effects on Europe derived from the logical conclusion that it would inevitably touch on military alliances and her own security policy. Certain major questions emerged from statements of government officials on detente in the mid-1970s. Would it lead to the final elimination of the bipolar system? What would emerge as the dominant features and rules of conduct of the new system? Would these possible changes imply equal security for Turkey, and if not, would Turkey suddenly find herself in a security vacuum? Anxiety over the unknown led Turkey to stress on the one hand that defense must not be neglected and, on the other hand the detente process must include the smaller forces. If detente in the first part of the 1970s was not a solid basis for peace, but at most a calculated hope that required calculated moves, the preservation of a strong defense seemed to be essential pre-condition.

As a result, the credibility of American security commitments was eroded by the arms embargo on Turkey. Turkish Armed Forces suffered badly as a result of this embargo, but the real damage was psychological. By obliterating the distinction between allies and enemies, the embargo greatly reinforced Ankara's suspicions that in the event of a Soviet aggression the U.S. might leave Turkey to fend for itself. The embargo not only failed to promote a settlement in Cyprus, but also worked against Western security interests by weakening further the defense posture of the Southern Flank.

Finally the embargo affair revealed to the Turks the extent to which the U.S. Congress was beginning to play an increasingly influential role in important foreign policy and security decisions.<sup>36</sup> Domestic political issues and special interest groups in the U.S. were now essential components of the U.S. foreign policy decision making process. This caused some anxiety in Turkish political circles: What sort of reliance could be placed on an allied nation where vital decisions were made by a legislative body that enjoyed power without accepting responsibility for it, and which was so vulnerable to pressure from special interest groups?

The three year arms embargo helped to elevate the security and peace aspects of detente to a more prominent position in Turkish security thinking in the second half of the 1970s. It transformed detente into a major supplement to the security sought through military defense arrangements. The need to reaffirm trust

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Chipman, John, *NATO's Southern Allies*, 1988.

in detente and pursue a peaceful posture in her exposed position has been reinforced as the problems with the U.S. cut deeper into the later's credibility and as the sense of isolation from Western Europe increased.

All these developments led Turkish leader to diversify Turkey's foreign policy and to establish Turkey's own defense industry, but her security policies would base on NATO strategy again. So, Turkish governments placed a far greater emphasis on developing relations with Middle Eastern nations. On the other hand, Turkey went on buying from foreign markets on a scale that is bound to upset domestic priorities (see tables 1a and 1b for details), to come anywhere close to NATO standards, since she didn't have a domestic defense industry. Especially in 1980s there was attempts to establish her own defense industry such as Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (DIDA). After a while, Turkey would get the first results of her own defense industry.

While NATO was dealing with its internal problems such as the tension between Turkey and Greece in its southern flank, two blocs, NATO and Warsaw, were experiencing a period of relaxation of tendencies which was a decade detente as we talked above. It did, however, create a period of non-direct confrontation and peaceful co-existence which finally fell apart with the invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, ushering in a sense the second part of the cold war. Gorbachev, however, brought to an end the antagonism that had existed in the early 1980s and which had been as equally dangerous as the first part of the cold war.

### **3. Turkish Armed Forces and NATO Obligations**

Turkey has made a major contribution to NATO since 1952. During the postwar era, the Turkish Armed Forces were the second largest in NATO and represent 37% of the standing military personnel available to the Western Alliance. Turkey defended 27% of NATO Europe and 37% of the allied frontier with the Warsaw Pact, including a 610 km border with the Soviet Union. Also Turkey shared a frontier with a Warsaw Pact member, Bulgaria.<sup>37</sup>

Turkey's traditional role in NATO has been concerned with the control of the Straits and the prevention of any Warsaw Pact advance towards the Middle East. And NATO strategy for the success of the Turkey's role relied almost on the Turkish Armed Forces. But Turkish Armed Forces faced immense geographical, logistical and economic problems in their attempts to maintain their obligations.

Turkey had an underdeveloped economy which was unable to equip forces to NATO standards was acknowledged from the very beginning of Turkey's association with NATO, even though Turkey has regularly ranked among the first five of NATO members in terms of the proportion of GNP devoted to defense. Turkey's GNP was also one of the lowest among NATO members (see tables 1a and 1b).

Therefore, this underdeveloped economic situation affected the armed forces. Turkish Armed Forces in the 1940s, described by Alastair Buchanan as a

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*Jane's NATO Handbook, "Turkey: Country Studies," 1990/1991.*

form of outdoor relief, had progressed little beyond World War I in its levels of equipment. The equipment level of the Turkish Armed Forces has always depended on a trade off between numbers and sophistication. Population growth since World War II, combined with an emphasis on conscription, has produced a long term trend of steady increase in numbers. During the World War II, the size of forces rose to 800,000 men, and was still around 700,000 when Turkey joined the Alliance. During the 1950s, largely as a result of U.S. advice, it was reduced to around 400,000 men (see table 2 for further comparison).<sup>38</sup>

So, to maintain its obligations, Turkey was in need of NATO assistance, and cooperation with NATO countries. In practice, assistance and cooperation with NATO meant American access to Turkish territory for facilities and bases, and the improvement of the defense capability of the Turkish Armed Forces with the American help. Of course Turkey was not the only NATO country dependent on U.S. military assistance--American support for Europe was an essential aspect of the Atlantic Alliance--but in late 1970s we see that the developed European members have emerged as economic and industrial powers, while Turkey has merely reached a take off stage and stayed there.

Under the agreements, U.S. instructors were brought in and service manuals translated into Turkish. U.S. troops and military installations began to operate on Turkish soil. Turkey was the third in the list of recipients U.S. aid, after

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<sup>38</sup>

Bachard, David, *Turkey and the West*, 1985.

Israel and Egypt. For example, between 1946 and 1974, Turkey received \$3.7 billion in military assistance, the form of assistance changing over time from grants to credits and cash sales.<sup>39</sup>

But, the annual lobbying and skirmishing in the U.S. Congress to get the administration's aid proposals accepted places major strains on Turkish-American relations and was described as nerve-racking by Turkish officials, not least when the effort runs up against U.S. Greek and Armenian (and sometimes pro-Israeli) lobbies trying to get the size of the package reduced. After the Cyprus conflict of 1974, and especially during the 1980s, there was great pressures on Congress and U.S government from these lobbies, to give these aids under some conditions such as related with the solution in Cyprus conflict. And there was similar tendencies among other NATO members against Turkey. And these behaviors affected the relations between Turkey and NATO.

In addition to U.S., in 1964, West Germany became the second major source of military help, providing about DM 35 million of assistance annually in the 1960s, and rising to an annual DM 70 million in the 1970s. In 1980s, German assistance continued to increase for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. But especially in 1980s, German and NATO's other European members' limited assistance began to be under some conditions such as Cyprus issue, human rights and

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<sup>39</sup> "Controversy Over the Cutoff of Military Aid to Turkey," *Congressional Digest*, April 1975.

democratic institutions. And these developments affected the course of relations negatively and changed the form and amount of the assistance.

But the Turkish officials became aware of the situation especially after the Cyprus conflict of 1974. Turkey was in need of a domestic defense industry. At this time, Turkey was, according to Eurogroup descriptions a Category A member country, which is one with no or virtually no, industrial bases and thus not in a position to produce or co-produce a wide range of sophisticated equipment. So, such a country needs external aid to finance its defense effort. When the defense effort is dependent on several factors, as in the case of Turkey in this period, long-term national planning can be highly uncertain exercise.

Until the mid-1980s Turkey was not in a position to benefit from cooperative developments in European weapons procurement, partly because no comparable evolution has taken place in her economic and industrial development. Although industry has reached a level of when it can undertake substantial defense production, the need for capital and for technology transfer has been a major obstacle. Defense production has not made a significant contribution to the national economy, and defense cooperation with the other NATO members in the meantime has continued to be confined to financial assistance in the form of credits. The pace of technological change was such as to make credit arrangements politically unattractive both the donor and the recipient countries.

Turkey was formally a member of the Eurogroup and the Independent European Programma Group but in practice her membership has not resulted in

concrete schemes for cooperation, apart from West German cooperation in the development of the shipbuilding industry. Elaborate ideas developed to promote a two-way street between the U.S. and European NATO. Turkey was not considered in this context.

Like the developed members of NATO in Europe, Turkey felt the need to cooperate in the procurement of defense equipment, but her traditional position as an American protege and the wide gap in the level of development between Turkey and the other European members have prevented the emergence of a dialogue on how unequal allies should cooperate for security.

Turkey attempted to solve her defense industry problems. But there were economic problems and a lack of access to high technology. In attempt to overcome some of these deficiencies, the Turkish Government established the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (DIDA) in 1985.<sup>40</sup> DIDA is central in Turkish plans to build an economically viable indigenous defense manufacturing industry. It is responsible for the management of a fund which will be used to encourage investment in Turkey. Investment of projects is partly determined by the ease in which they can be integrated with the Turkish defense industry and cost effectiveness. One of the DIDA's main objectives is to create defense products of NATO standard in specification and quality control.

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*Jane's NATO Handbook*, "Turkey: Country Studies," 1991/1992.

DIDA has had already a galvanizing impact on the Turkish defense industry. Significant aerospace enterprise, rocket and missile systems projects, new types of frigates and submarines were the first results of this attempt. But, despite the remarkable progress which has been made in developing a viable and relatively diverse defense industry, economic instability threatened to undermine the modernization progress in late 1980s.

#### 4. Turkey-NATO relations under the Resource Dependency Theory

Resource Dependency Theory will help us to present some ideas concerning the interactions between an organization and the environment, and to demonstrate the implications of these ideas for the design of management control systems. Also we will see how best to organize in order to cope with the effects of complexity and unpredictability in the environment.<sup>41</sup>

Let's think about NATO and its environment. Interactions with environment can be dealt in two parts. First part is internal control system, namely the goal formation process. According to the theory the meaning of the goal does not imply that goals well defined or permanent, but suggests that they are multifaceted, possibly conflicting and subject to change within the organization. And also it says that individuals and groups in the organization have needs which they expect the organization to satisfy, and these needs will differ between individuals and between

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<sup>41</sup> Pfeffer and Salanick, *Resource Dependency Theory*, 1978.

groups. On the other hand the goals are based on value judgments by those who set the standard.

In NATO's case, in the beginning of the formation of the alliance, it was for sure that all parties had the common problem that is Soviet threat. And they accepted a common defense strategy. But later in response to developments of Soviet strategies, and new weapons systems, NATO changed its strategy. But this time we saw some states' needs differed from the others'. For example, Turkey had many complaints that this new strategy (flexible response) didn't fit her security needs. But NATO couldn't find a good solution which fits to all parties' needs.

On the other hand, to implement the defined strategies, NATO countries had to have some certain standards in military organizations and troop and equipments must be at the planned level. In this case, again every country was in need of different kinds of aid. Turkey, at her entrance date, was the poorest country and her military needed more aid than others. But, as noted earlier, there wasn't clear goals that at which level and kind of aid will be give to Turkey. When we reached 1980s, we saw that Turkey was in the same situation, there wasn't any change in her military capabilities. Turkey was still in the worst category in comparison to other NATO countries.

Also conflicts or similarities between the interests and goals cause problem in the organization. When we look at the Turkish-Greek relations, the conflicts between these countries led them to use some of their resources against

each other, not their common threat. And this has weakened the defense of the Southern Region.

Theory suggests that where there is significant interdependence between group, the ability of any group to control its own pattern of contribution will depend on its ability to influence others within the organization. When dependence on a particular resource is high, then the organization is similarly dependent on those who control access to it. The more critical the resource to the success or survival of the organization, then the greater the power of those who can ensure its constant availability.

In NATO, Turkey, with its geopolitical position and large number of troops, had an important resource when she entered the Alliance. Other NATO countries accepted her membership because of this reason. They were in need of this kind contribution. But what Turkey did was not use this advantage for her own benefit. In the cold war period, Turkish leaders couldn't think to use important resources to get more aid or to determine strategies which will be more suitable to her defense needs. They couldn't affect the organization to act for her own needs.

But in the contrary, Turkey's economic and military needs were used as an control mechanism against Turkey. Turkey was dependent on this external aid. And the U.S. was the only power controlling activities within the organization by its economic and military power. Turkey didn't plan to get rid of this effects until early 1980s. After this, Turkey began to establish its domestic defense industry, and to

develop her economic power with new economic policies, to get rid of these external effects.

The second part of the theory is external control, that is the demands made upon the organization by powerful actors of its environment. This part can be explained by NATO-Warsaw Pact relations. This time relations between different organizations are the subjects. Like internal groups, in the external environment there are different organizations which compete with each other to control some resources for their own needs and effectiveness. The main goal of the Warsaw Pact was to expand the communist regime to other countries by any means. And all countries were its possible targets. And Czechoslovakia, Korea, Afghanistan were some test points against NATO. Both Organization attempt to control important strategic points (a resource for the success of both organization) to implement their goals.

In this context Turkey was an explicit target by the U.S.S.R in early postwar period. Turkey was an important resource for both organizations. So in postwar period Turkey sometimes found herself at top of the disputes between the superpowers. But Turkish leaders couldn't use Turkey's situation as a weapon to take an advantage in the world politics, except joining NATO.

## **IV. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE POSTWAR ERA**

### **A. INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT**

Admission to NATO fixed Turkey's place in the West. The initiative for increasing ties with the U.S. and later for membership of NATO had come during the last years of the Republican People Party (RPP) Administration. The landslide victory of the Democrat Party in 1950 therefore only strengthened the new direction of Turkey's foreign and defense policies. Prime Minister Menderes was an articulate supporter of the idea of solidarity with the free world. Except for some opposition to legal and procedural matters by the major opposition party, bipartisan foreign policy was the rule until the 1960s.

The security link with Europe was buttressed by others. Membership or ties of association with a number of western European institutions, ultimately aimed at European unity or integration of one type or another, broadened the relationship into the political, social, and economic spheres. Having been a recipient of Marshall Plan assistance, Turkey became a member of the OEEC, in 1949 she became a member of the European Council, and in 1964 an associate member of the EEC. Within a decade, Turkey became, for all political and strategic purposes, a member of the West. Although socially and economically she lagged far behind, there was domestic consensus which looked forward to full association with the West until the

mid 1960s. But later, Turkish leaders looked for more diversified foreign policies, because of the Western countries actions which stemmed from especially the Cyprus conflicts.

On the other hand, while Turkey was enjoying democratic freedoms and institutions during the interwar and cold war periods, the circle of decision makers has expanded beyond the small elite of the 1940s, then made up of the party officials and bureaucrats, newly emerged social groups vie with each other to have an effect in the formulation of official policy. Many people have travelled abroad and returned with new ideas, communication networks have increased, and television entered almost every home, bringing world events readily to people's attention. A new and less Eurocentric generation with new ideas has joined the ranks of the foreign policy decision makers in the following years.

Meanwhile, they learned that their daily problems are more like those encountered by the people of the third world countries than those of Europeans. Domestic priorities have become more important at the moment when alternative ways merged of looking at the world in general and security issues in particular. And Turkey's domestic political, economic and social structure become diversified. Now we can look at how these developments effected the Turkish leaders while they were deciding the Turkey's security issues.

## **1. Decision Making Process**

Under the constitution of 1921 and during the years of War of Independence against the occupying powers after the World War I, parliament in Ankara (the Grand National Assembly) played a determining role in foreign affairs and defense. But the subsequent constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982 considerably reduced the role of the legislative in foreign and defense policies. During the post war era and at present, the Council of Ministers, presided over by the Prime Minister and advised by the National Security, appears to be the main decision making organ. In case of vital national interest, the cabinet may be chaired by the President of Republic, and the Chief of the General Staff also attends the meeting. The reports of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the advice of the Chief of the General Staff usually play a considerable part in governmental decisions on security policy. The Ministry of National Defense seems more to execute policies than to make strategic decisions. It deals with the political, legal, social, and financial aspects of national defense. It is responsible, within the framework of the principles and priorities decided on by the General Staff, for the recruitment of the armed forces, weapons procurement, the defense industry, infrastructure, military health services, and financial matters.

The National Security has been playing a growing role in security affairs. Its main function is to advise the Council of Ministers on the formulation and implementation of the national security policy of the state. The constitution of 1982 provides that the Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the

**decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and civil peace.**

**In the terms of the 1982 constitution, the office of the Commander-in-Chief is inseparable from the spiritual existence of the Grand National Assembly, and is represented by the President of the Republic.**

**Naturally the Council of Ministers is responsible to the Grand National Assembly for foreign affairs, national security, and the organization of the armed forces. The annual parliamentary debate on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides an opportunity to discuss foreign policy questions. These questions, and security matters in general, can be brought at any time before the Assembly by its members. In practice, however, the legislative branch has little control on the defense policy in the strictest sense. Defense is regarded as a question of vital national interest, and is usually kept outside of political conflicts. The strategic choices are made by the General Staff, and are implemented by the Council of Ministers normally without parliamentary restriction.**

**Treaties are usually ratified and promulgated by the President of the Republic. Although the ratification of treaties is legally subject to adoption by the Assembly, agreements in connection with the implementation of a treaty, or administrative agreements concluded on the basis of special legal authorization, do not require parliamentary approval.**

A parliamentary enactment in 1963 authorized the Council of Ministers to conclude all the international agreements related to NATO without recourse to the legislative. In the 1960s and 1970s, the constitutionality of this law was subject to long discussions in the Turkish legal community. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court decided on 4 March 1965 in favor of this law and practice. For example, in conformity with the same law, the government concluded on 18 November 1980, the Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy between Turkey and the U.S., and all the supplementary agreements annexed to it.

The government's decision to send troops to the Korean War provoked a long public discussion on the respective powers of the Grand National Assembly and the Council of Ministers. So, the constitutions of 1961 and 1982, in order to eliminate the ambiguities of the constitution of 1924, unequivocally gave the Grand National Assembly the authority to declare war, to send Turkish forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey. Notwithstanding this provision, the constitution of 1982 authorizes the President of the Republic to decide, while the parliament is in recess, on the use of the armed forces if the country is subjected to armed aggression.

## 2. Socio-economic Situation

Post war internal and external developments helped to shape a new attitude to the world as well as affecting internal political and economic priorities. Aspirations for economic development coincided with the introduction of political liberalization in the immediate post war period. The country opted for a place in the

West and welcomed western foreign assistance. The intensified economic activity of the 1950s, subsidized in part by American assistance and operating within a liberalized political framework, had a profound impact on the political and socio-economic profile of the country.

The alternative to one-party government and the offer of economic freedom and rewards spurred record voter participation and accelerated business initiative. The rural masses aspired to relief from endemic poverty, business and commercial interest groups enjoyed new profits, and new middle class expanded. Technical, managerial and professional skills increased, and the possessors of these modern skills and the new rich began to compete for political power.

What started as an ambitious development venture in the post war period brought about considerable economic growth, after planned development began in 1962.<sup>42</sup> The average annual rate of growth in GDP was 5.5% in 1963-67, 6.7% in 1968-72, and 7.1% in 1973-77. Per capita income of about \$100 in the 1950s rose to about \$300 in the mid-1960s and \$1000 in the mid-1970s. Increasing industrialization attracted the rural population to the cities at the same time as the mechanization of agriculture released more people from the land; migration from the villages to the cities accounted for 42.6% of urbanization in the 1960s and 63% in the 1970s.

Industrialization has turned labor into a power group, and efficient trade-unionism and the right to collective bargaining (granted in 1963) bolstered its

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<sup>42</sup> The State Planning Organization, *Developments in the Economy of Turkey (1963-1978)*, 1978.

position. These developments have significantly altered industrial relations in favor of labor and improved the status and buying power of the expanding working class. However, the frequency and duration of industrial disputes involving pay rises and fringe benefits have put Turkey among the first in Europe in terms of the number of days lost on strikes.

Economic growth has improved living standards in general but the development process has been painful. The development strategy was based on import substitution. Borrowing from external sources and inflationary measures were the major means of financing development. But we can see a dramatic transformation in the structure of the economy, as the following figures show (sectors as percentage of GNP):<sup>43</sup>

TABLE I.

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1983
Agriculture	37.9	31.0	26.2	22.5	22.0	17.9
Industry	15.9	19.6	22.3	24.4	24.5	27.0
Services	42.7	4.4	46.8	47.9	46.1	48.9

<sup>43</sup>

Barchard, David, *Turkey and the West*, 1985.

Despite this structural change from agriculture towards industry, however, neither the State Economic Enterprises, which constitute the backbone of industry, with their unproductive resource allocations and uninspired management, nor private enterprise, which found supplying the large domestic markets, could reach the necessary level of exports.

The momentum and costs of development could be maintained as long as there was no major shock in the international environment that would upset the pattern of import substitution and the means of financing it. Concessional aid began to dwindle in the 1970s, but the adverse effects of this trend were compensated for largely by the foreign currency remittances of the Turkish guest workers employed in Western Europe, mostly in West Germany, following Turkey's association with the EEC in 1964.

After 1975, however, Turkey began to feel the effects of developments in the world economy. The rise in the price of oil and petroleum products, the recession in the West and the rise in the price of capital and intermediary goods which figured regularly on her import list threatened the growth rate target. The remittances of workers decreased. The bill for crude oil increased from \$124 million in 1972 to \$1.2 billion in 1977, and overall import bill almost quadrupled in the same period, jumping from about \$1.5 billion to \$5.8 billion.

By 1978, the economy had reached a point where investment had to be slowed down. There was an amounting balance of payments deficit, and to make up for the deficit Turkey borrowed heavily from foreign commercial banks over short

terms and at high interest rates and cashed her reserves. The means of generating the foreign currency needed for imports--external resource transfers and exports-- seemed to have reached their limits by 1977-78 and imports of raw materials and equipment have had to be cut down.

Given such a backlog of problems, it was inevitable that economic policy should have become one of the central themes of debate. The economic crisis has focused both the policy makers' and intellectuals' attention on the question of the relevance of the capitalist road to development for Turkey. Her experiences have demonstrated the inter-dependence between, on one hand, domestic development, foreign trade and the international monetary system, and, on the other hand, the dangerous vulnerability of a developing economy to international economic and financial fluctuations.

Issues not directly economic have also widened the range of problems. The Turkish population increased dramatically. In the early 1960s, when planned economic development became official policy, the high rate of population growth was recognized as one of the impediments to development, and modest moves for family planning were undertaken by the Ministry of Health. But, the pressure of population growth on the economy did not appear to be an issue for any of the political parties.

Another source of strain on the economy has been the increase in defense expenditures in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The defense share of total government expenditures jumped from 20.5% in 1974, to 26.6% in 1976. It stabilized at around 22% in 1977-78.(see table 1b for details).

After these developments, Turkish governments tried to find some solutions to these problems, and they had some interactions with some international organizations such as IMF, OECD, and EEC. In addition to these external attempts, there was some internal attempts such as curbing spending, tax reform, to fix the economy. An entirely new package, geared to liberal principles was implemented in early 1980. New measures counted on market forces, limited state intervention and new foreign loans and credits to be negotiated with the OECD countries and the IMF to remobilize productive capacity and to curb inflation.

In 1983, after the 1980 coup, new Turkish government led by Ozal, introduced further changes to the economy. The Ozal government appeared to have a Japanese model behind its thinking, in which a strong economy geared towards exports retains distinctive and indeed rather isolationist cultural and traditional values. And the full membership application on 14 April 1987 for EEC was one biggest and boldest attempts of Ozal government.

Since 1980 the government has committed itself to cutting subsidies and reducing overmanning in the State Economic Enterprises. The private sector manufacturing has continued to grow steadily during the 1980s. The volume of foreign trade has risen sharply. Exports have risen while imports grew less swiftly. Shortages and power cuts have disappeared. Most strikingly, GNP increased dramatically (see table 3 for details).

Industrialization, originally seen as a defensive adaptation but during this period viewed as the completion of an already well advanced social transformation,

was a preoccupation of Turkish foreign policy makers. The maximization of economic assistance and the removal of obstacles to trade, such as EC quota restrictions on Turkish textile exports, were typical themes. On the other hand, Turkey has not developed specialized commercial and economic services for exporters within its diplomatic services, although the importance of economic diplomacy, as well as that of the job of deputy under secretary for economic affairs in the Foreign Ministry, has increased markedly since 1980.

When we have reached the late 1980s, while very fast and unpredictable developments were occurring all around the world, especially in Eastern Block countries, the developments occurred in Turkey, were likely to bring Turkey into the mainstream of the international business world and world politics.

### **3. Political Culture**

The experiences with modernization in late 1940s and 1950s--exposure to political opposition, competitive politics and popular participation, social reforms, expanded national education, improved communications, the rush to the city and economic growth--had by then eroded most of the traditional loyalties. This changed the earlier crude stratification of society and crystallized class consciousness around economic interests. The efficient nation-wide party organizations of the 1950s educated the people in the merits of the democracy, and relative emancipation from poverty and changes in the lifestyle of both the peasantry and the urban population as a result served to stimulate yet higher aspirations.

In the first half of the 1960s, therefore, Turkey seemed to be ready and willing to move to a pluralist democracy where any view and interest could be organized to compete for political and economic power. Political democracy required that all ideas should be allowed to find free expression, while economic democracy required that all groups should share equitably in the allocation of national opportunities and resources, including the wealth created by economic growth. Social justice became a goal.

The political spectrum was refined and differentiated. The Republican People Party (RPP) introduced a left-of-center philosophy, while Justice Party (JP) was on the right-of-center. In 1965 a Marxist political party (Turkish Workers Party [TWP]) entered the Assembly for the first time, a most important event for the Turkish political development. Since the criminal law banned Communism, this party had to call itself socialist. It did initiate the great foreign policy debate of the mid-1960s, when the Cyprus crisis had first mobilized anti-American sentiment. For the first time in post-war history, ties with the U.S. and NATO came under vigorous attack in public, neutralism and non-alignment were proposed instead, and memories of the Ataturk-Lenin period were revived.

Although the Left failed in electoral terms, left-wing ideologies became popular both in the universities and more widely among the young. The TWP had promised to lead the movement but its electoral failures and the divisions within its own ranks made it largely ineffectual in this role. No alternative leadership emerged and the Left broke into splinter groups. Frustrated at the ballot box, some youth

groups turned to terror. The violence and the terror of the late 1960s brought about the military intervention of 1971, and the subsequent drive against the Left further diminished its strength and broke up its unity.

However, the Left's initial electoral success and its appeal to the youth immediately made it seem a threat to the Turkish Right. This mobilized the extreme Right into action. Terror became their weapon too. But, while rejecting organic ties with the West, for fear that they would eliminate Turkish culture and identity, they considered the association with NATO a necessary component of Turkish foreign policy because of the organizations anti-Communist and anti-Soviet stand.

During this period, another significant development was the emergence of the National Salvation Party (NSP). This has campaigned for the revival of Islamic values and traditions. Because it viewed the penetration of Turkey by western values and influences as part of western imperialism, it was against close ties with the West, advocating instead cooperation with the community of Islam. Traditional votes made this party the third largest party during the mid-1970s. It became a key party for coalition governments.

It was a democratic view that all kinds of ideas were represented in political life. But in late 1970s there was not any compromise between political parties. This situation accelerated the terror in Turkey while its economic conditions were also worsening. This brought the 1980 coup to Turkey.

After 1980 coup, these parties were closed. With the first free elections and new political parties, Turkish political activities began in 1983. This time,

Motherland Party (MP), which was said to represent the different political ideas in one party, enjoyed the majority governments during the rest of 1980s. MP, led by Ozal, introduced to Turkey new political and economic issues. The most important one was to learn the make compromise in political life, not to fight or terror. In the late 1980s, even though old extreme left and right parties began to be seen in Turkish political life, they were not effective. And the Left was still looking for the unity.

MP was a pro-Western and pro-American party. Their government actions got big support from the West. MP government did apply for the full membership of EC, which forwards an economic and military integration among the member states. But first signals from the EC was negative. So this decision may change actions of Turkish government and political parties against the West in the following years.

#### **4. Military in Turkish Society**

The regular officer corps of the Turkish Armed Forces is trained at the military schools and academies which are open to all classes and the candidates are drawn from a broad social base. Most of the manpower is provided by normally doing a certain time of compulsory service. The function of military service is not only to teach the conscripts how to defend their country, but also to improve their education and skills. The army plays an integrated role by mixing up recruits from different regions and by increasing their ability to work together. These were the

main features of Turkish army at the very first years of the Republic, and still keeps the same.

Turkish democracy came into existence in the 1940s with the consent and support of the armed forces. The military has emerged as the custodian of the state and reforms against anti-secularist, communist, separatist and irredentist-fascist movements, and as the defenders of political democracy against the continual failure of the civilian governments to implement or protect it.<sup>44</sup> The Turkish military's high level of discipline and professionalism does not favor the adoption of extremist ideologies by its officers. Despite this professionalism, however, it shows certain praetorian tendencies. Its praetorianism does not consist of attempts at changing the socio-political system or the main course of Turkey's security policies.<sup>45</sup>

On the contrary, its political interventions have been of a moderating and civilian-oriented nature. There have been three military interventions in the political process in 1960, 1971, 1980. Although the socio-political forces motivating each intervention differed, there was no instance where the aim of the military was to establish an authoritarian regime. The military considered these interventions as necessary to preserve, rather than abrogate, the country's democratic institutions. The generals have always disliked the immersion of soldiers in political affairs to the detriment of their military functions. Whenever the military intervened in the

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<sup>44</sup> Karpat, Kemal, *Turkish Democracy at Impasse*, 1981.

<sup>45</sup> Perlmutter, Amos, *The Military in Modern Times*, 1977.

political process, it did so unwillingly, and for the purpose of consolidating democracy.

There seemed to be a general consensus that Turkey has moved closer to the West European democratic system in late 1980s. These developments may be taken as evidence of rapid progress in the reestablishment of the democratic system after the 1980 coup.

Studying the 1980s' enactments, declarations and publications issued by military, it was observed that the post-1980 military regime has changed the traditional republican system of ethics by infusing it with new principles.<sup>46</sup> The military also emphasized, in the post-1980 publications on Ataturkism, tolerance of others' opinions as well as the need to defend the integrity of the nation. They also took measures to reduce the patrimonial character of the civil bureaucracy and to reform it on the basis of a purely instrumental rationale.

These developments can be read as indicating strongly that the military no longer views civil society as a subordinate entity or itself as possessing a monopoly of wisdom and truth. The post-1980 behavior of the military, together with the growing maturity of the electorate and changes in the economic system, will lead to a better system of checks and balances which will make regulation from above a less necessary means of moderating political conflict.

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Heper, Metin, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, 1985.

## **5. Religion**

During the period of transition from empire to nation state, Islam served as a source of national unity against the invading foreign powers, the aim of the Kemalist reforms after the victory was to free the politics entirely from religion.

They adopted a purely territorial and linguistic brand of nationalism. Ataturk, unimpaired by a colonial heritage, refrained from placing the moral responsibility for Turkish underdevelopment on Western nations.<sup>47</sup> Thus, unlike nationalism in Arab countries, Turkish nationalism is essentially secular and devoid of any anti-Western component.

In spite of the secularization movement, Islam has always been present in the individual and social life of a great majority of Turkish citizens. The aim of Kemalist reforms was not, in fact, to eradicate religion from individual and social life, but to achieve a complete separation of religion from political life. Between 1945 and 1980, some politicians used religion as a means of political mobilization. There were attempts to politicize some religious groups. But these initiatives were clearly motivated by reasons of power politics rather than by religious fervor, and there were no politically organized attempts to repudiate the fundamental principles of Ataturkism. There were political parties which were for the Islamic values, but during the 1960 to late 1980s, they couldn't muster more than 12% of the votes, even at their most favorable time.

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<sup>47</sup> Chipman, John, *NATO's Southern Allies*, 1988.

This composition continued after the military intervention of 1980. Even though there was some critics about Turkey's political future because of the possible effects of Iranian Revolution, but that kind of ideologies couldn't find much supporter in Turkey. With this secular type of government, but with the majority of muslim population, Turkey continue to be a model country to other muslim countries.

#### 6. Terrorism

In Turkey, terrorism has developed as a multidimensional phenomenon. It cannot be satisfactorily explained merely on the basis of sociological or economical analysis. When terrorist activities began in Turkey in 1968, they were led by a mild educational reform movement of university students, but they rapidly changed character, escalating to violent clashes with the police and security forces.

Terrorism after 1975 became more widespread and destabilizing than it had been during the 1968-72 period. Parallel to the terrorism in Turkey, acts of violence by Armenian terrorists against Turkish targets abroad escalated. And together with the economic problems, terrorism caused the military to intervene in 1980.

The total numbers of various arms captured from the terrorists after September 1980 amounts to 800,000; the total value of such arsenal is estimated at approximately 300 million dollars. Almost none of these weapons were manufactured in Turkey. Profits from bank robberies by terrorist organizations can account for only a very small fraction of their cost. Turkish authorities estimated total terrorist

spending from 1977 to 1980 at one billion dollars. This is the equivalent of U.S. and other NATO military aid to Turkey for the same period.<sup>48</sup> This fact constitutes circumstantial evidence that terrorism against Turkey has been financed by external powers with considerable interest in destabilizing the country. There were some suspicion in Turkey about her neighbors. And Soviet, Bulgarian and Syrian roles, moreover, have become quite clear from the confessions of captured terrorists.

Terrorism has complicated Turkey's relations with its allies. Terror inside the country has not only posed a threat to Turkey's democratic stability and internal security, but has also decreased her reliability as an ally. More importantly, it has created indignation and frictions. While some allies have criticized Turkey's efforts to check terrorist activities, they have also tolerated the free movement of Turkish terrorist across international borders and within allied countries.

With the military intervention of 1980, terrorist activities sharply disappeared in Turkey. But in mid-1980s, terrorist activities began in especially Southeastern Turkey. And in late 1980, it was seen in big cities too. According to the background of this activities and current reports, again external powers were interested in Turkey's unity and security. Turkish leaders believe that this time, again, terrorist organizations will be the losers.

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<sup>48</sup>

Barchard, David, *Turkey and the West*, 1985.

## **7. External Environment**

### **a. Foreign Policy**

In general, late modernizing states seem to have different preoccupations and goals, and make difficult partners. In Turkey's case, successive political parties have colored Turkey's foreign policy to some extent, causing emphasis to shift from time to time, foreign affairs have always been treated as national rather than party political matters. And Turkey's ambiguous geographical and cultural situation makes difficult to determine the foreign policy.

In Turkey, foreign affairs always were over the political matters. For example, in the 1940s, the President Inonu, before deciding to go ahead with the introduction of multiparty democracy, was careful to receive assurances from the incipient civilian opposition that the basic continuity of Turkish foreign policy would not be challenged.

As in other late modernizing countries, the role of public opinion in foreign policy is obtrusive, with press coverage of many topics being noisy and emotional and acting as a major constraint on the government. This is particularly the case where such issues as the Cyprus problem, disputes with Greece and relations with Europe concerned. For the press, national prestige often appears to be a goal in itself, with headlines focusing on foreign television programs, or irredentist maps, or hostile remarks about Turkey.

Despite its visibility, the role of public opinion is in some ways narrower than in Western societies. Except among some extremist groups, the right of the military to act as the ultimate arbiters of national interest is unquestioned.

Caution, based on awareness of limited resources, dominates Turkish foreign policy. The bureaucratic and nationalist background of Turkish foreign policy makers can be a disadvantage when dealing with public opinion and other manifestations of the pluralist life of the West.<sup>49</sup>

The main objective in Turkey's foreign policy is the maintenance of the state and its independence. A sense of encirclement by unfriendly neighbors, and of proximity to an unstable and violent area, was always evident. So the principle formulated by Ataturk "peace at home, peace abroad" became the cornerstone of Turkey's conduct in external relations. This implied a policy based on the maintenance of the status quo and on the survival of a relatively homogeneous national state with clear Turkish identity. In line of with this thinking, Turkish leaders considered security as a whole, and were concerned not only with regional problems but also with security matters beyond their immediate environment.

In post war era, Turkish leaders pursued parallel policies which described above. In early 1950s, Turkish government continued the foreign policy of its predecessors in its entirety. Based on the recognition of Soviet imperialism a danger number one, this policy aimed at consolidation of political links with the West

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<sup>49</sup>

Barchard, David, *Turkey and the West*, 1985.

and improvement of Turkey's military and strategic position (by way of NATO, European Council, EEC).

In conformity with these objectives, Turkey sought not only to cultivate their friendship with the U.S. and other Western countries but also to improve relations with their immediate neighbors in the Balkans and the Middle East. Marshal Tito's defection from the Soviet camp and his veering toward the West enabled Turkey to work for entente of free Balkan states as an additional barrier to Soviet expansionism. Negotiations aiming at this objective resulted of a pact of collaboration between Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece in 1953.

Unfortunately, this new spirit of friendship was not destined to last long. With Yugoslavia turning back toward neutralism and the Cyprus issue dividing Greece and Turkey, the usefulness of the Balkan Pact became highly questionable. By the end of 1955 relations between Athens and Ankara had reached their lowest point in the thirty five years following the Peace Settlement.

Greater success was Turkey's in her relations with the states in the Middle East. She was anxious to secure her right flank by closer ties with Asian countries threatened by Soviet expansion. Turkey spearheaded the action to bring about an alliance of the Northern Tier states. This became the basis for a regional alliance, to be known as the Baghdad Pact, which included Turkey, Britain, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq.

Although Turkey's accession to the Baghdad Pact ostensibly strengthened her security, it also presented her with certain complications and dangers. Indeed, Baghdad Pact was a part of the containment strategy.

But after a while, Turkey found herself suddenly facing the Communist danger on both northern and southern borders because of the massive economic, political, and cultural Soviet penetration of Syria. The fear of encirclement led Turkish leaders to take certain diplomatic and military actions with an eye to averting the danger to her security. In the diplomatic sector Turkish spokesmen made a point of impressing upon Western public opinion the danger to the Free World that the possible communization and satellization of Syria presented. Turkey's anxiety about the trends in Syria was not ill-founded. The U.S. shared it to a considerable extent. And Turkish-Syrian crisis was eventually overshadowed and displaced by the movement for the unification of Syria with Egypt, which gained momentum in the fall of 1957.

Another major issue claimed Turkey's attention between 1958 and 1960, namely, the problem of the future status of Cyprus. The London Agreement was signed by the premiers of Turkey and Greece in 1960, who succeeded in putting an end to a dispute which had plagued their relations ever since 1955 and had threatened seriously to weaken NATO defenses in this part of the world.

In 1960s, the most general characterization that could be given to the trends in Turkish foreign policy was that the government emphasized independence and freedom of action. This meant a change in attitudes toward the Soviet Union as

well as weakening of ties with the U.S. Beginning in 1964 when cabinet level visits were exchanged between Ankara and Moscow, an era of normalization of relations was inaugurated between the two countries. Preoccupied with other problems, the Soviet leadership modified, at least outwardly, its earlier attitude of hostility toward Turkey. Instead it began stressing peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation.

These political overtures were accompanied by concrete offers of economic and technical assistance, some of which accepted. As a result a number of Soviet technicians appeared in Turkey, an innovation contrasting strongly with the mood of mutual hostility characteristic of the 1950s. As long as it suited Turkey's needs, however, there was no reason for the Turkish leaders to reject any peaceful Soviet manifestation and thus they responded positively to such overtures as did not affect other basic ties and commitments to the West or to their neighbors in the Middle east.

In the meantime, in 1964, at a conference in Istanbul, Turkey signed an agreement with the Asian member of CENTO, Iran and Pakistan, establishing an organization called Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).<sup>50</sup> But the political and psychological purpose of RCD was to stress the independent regional planning of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and to show Moscow that these three countries were interested in mutual cooperation not necessarily for military purposes.

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Magnus, R.H., *Documents on the Middle East, 1969.*

Another major issue in 1960s, which affected the Turkish foreign policy was 1962 Cuban missile crisis. It involved the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a major diplomatic quarrel with possible implications of global war, indirectly contributed to the weakening of American-Turkish ties.<sup>51</sup> American-Turkish relations did not experience serious deterioration, however, until the Cyprus crisis, which occurred in two installments, in 1964 and 1974, as we discussed earlier.

As the 1970s progressed, Turkey found herself facing fundamental dilemmas in her internal politics and foreign policies. In the foreign sector Turkey's main challenge was to rethink and reassess her international position both on the regional scale and in regard to the two superpowers. On the regional scale, three sectors could be distinguished; the northern Tier allies of Iran and Pakistan, the Arab world, and her western neighbor Greece. Of the three sectors, the first two appeared to pose no major problems. Because Turkey maintained a generally friendly and cooperative relationship while not repudiating her diplomatic relations with Israel. But relations with Greece suffered a great deterioration on account of Cyprus and Aegean Sea.

Therefore the Cyprus crisis of 1974 forced Turkey to make a choice between its perceived national interests and its relations with the U.S. and the West. In the mid-1970s came attempts to set up new military industries and to devise a more broadly based foreign policy. Actually this kind of policy was evident in early

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<sup>51</sup>

Lenczowski, George, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East*, 1971.

1970s. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Turkey refused to permit the U.S. access to refuelling and reconnaissance facilities for an airlift to Israel. In 1976, Turkey recognized the PLO and four years later Turkish government lowered its representative level in Israel. These were, in a sense, an excuse herself of being the first muslim country which recognized Israel.

In 1980s, Turkey continued to pursue its diversified foreign policy. There was an deterioration in relations between Turkey and European countries which stemmed from the military intervention of 1980. But Turkey was extremely anxious to project a positive image to the West. Integration within Europe has always been a major objective of Turkish policy. Especially with the Ozal government this attempt accelerated, and on 14 April 1987 Turkey submitted formal application for membership of the EC. Turkey resent playing a crucial role in NATO's southern region while being denied the opportunity to participate in the process of European political and economic cooperation. Turkish economic development, democratic institutions, and human rights were likely to delay Turkey's accession into the EC.

Turkey has increased efforts to further cooperation in the Balkans which is particularly welcome given the region's history of mutual antagonisms and internecine warfare. But the Bulgarian treatment of ethnic Turkish minority increased the tension between Turkey and Bulgaria.

Turkey was aware of the political and economic importance of the Middle East. The need of oil and some security problems which stemmed from the

separatist groups based in Iraq and Syria, led Turkish leaders to pay more attention to their southern neighbors.

On the other hand, Turkey's economic relations with the U.S. and Western countries increased. Especially Turkey's attempts to establish her own defense industry attracted foreign investors. Turkey's policy became "more trade, not more aid." Turkey was getting ready to compete, and also cooperate with other powers.

As we said earlier, in international relations, not only external factors but also internal factors can affect the decision makers. When we look at how Turkey's domestic situation affected the decision makers we see the followings.

The 1950s initiated a rapid growth in the national economy, characterized by the development of an industrial base that gave the private entrepreneur a greater voice in national affairs. It emerged as a participant in, if not a challenger to, the exclusive power of the politician and the bureaucrat. The multiparty system, the press, the universities and the intellectuals emerged as contentious participant in the formulation of foreign policy.

In the 1960s, the labor unions stepped into the fray. They began to weigh heavily on economic policy, and since economic development depended on aid and trade, the unions were inevitably pushed into the international arena.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, the one million Turks working in Western Europe created new

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<sup>52</sup>  
1977.

Eren, Nuri, *Turkey, NATO and Europe: A Deteriorating Relationship*,

problems with the EEC over such basic issues as social security rights and free circulation. During 1960s, foreign policy was also affected by the changes touching the remotest corners of the Turkish countryside. Rising standard of living of Turkish society was bounded to affect the country's national and international politics.

1970s also experienced the same kind of developments. The changes in the domestic scene have broken the national consensus on foreign policy. The injection of domestic concerns into the foreign affairs previously considered to be dangerous and even traitorous to national interests, has generally accepted at this period. Foreign affairs became top subject in election platforms. On the other hand Turkey had coalition governments in 1970s. In the absence of a clear majority and a strong government, Turkey couldn't make decisions or concessions on important foreign affairs such as Cyprus issue.

In 1980s, Turkish society experienced a rapid transition period. It became more open to international arena. The Ozal government with its majority power, made bold decisions in national and international arena. Turkey became more open to the international affairs. Interest groups affected the public opinion to make their minds on foreign policy. Turkey's security and defense expenditures was discussed publicly.

There is another point that we can talk about Turkey's foreign policies. When we look at Turkey's overall relations, we see that Turkey's policies doesn't change very quickly and unexpectedly. This can be explain in terms of big states and small states or in terms the movement of mouse and elephant. In

international relations big states' movements resemble the movements of elephant and small states' movement resembles the movement of mouse. An elephant moves slower than a mouse. This means a big or powerful state's policies change slower than a small state. This is because of the power of the big state that it can affect other states easily. In a sense it is a kind of organizational culture. In Turkey's case, Turkey is not a big state with respect to the superpowers. But she keeps the culture which comes from the Ottoman Empire. The feeling of being a big state and determining certain policies for the benefit of itself and pursue those policies was and is the main objective of Turkish leaders in international relations. So this unique property also shaped Turkey's foreign policy. And this kind of foreign policy began to increase Turkey's credibility and influence in the international arena. Some people talked about Turkey as the potential regional power.

*b. Soviet Union*

Soviet-Turkish relations remained frozen until the 1960s. The U.S.S.R. had sought normalization but Turkey had abstained. In a note of 30 May 1953, the Soviet Union withdrew the territorial claims of 1945 and considered possible the provision of security of the U.S.S.R. from the side of the Straits on conditions acceptable alike to the U.S.S.R. and to Turkey.<sup>53</sup> The cumbersome language concerning the Straits didn't satisfy the Turkish government at that time.

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Harris, George S., *The Troubled Alliance*, 1972.

The first major break was expected with the exchange of visits between Prime Minister Menderes and President Khrushchev, scheduled for July 1960. The need to tap new resources for economic assistance and an assessment that American-Soviet relations could be entering a new phase were some of the reasons behind the move.

Normalization of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union moved forward steadily after the clash with the U.S. over Cyprus in the summer of 1964. Normalization relied on three main instruments: high-level official visits; explicit agreement on the basic principle of international law on state independence and sovereignty and on the principle of peaceful co-existence between two different social systems; and Soviet economic assistance. The Soviet Union agreed to respect Turkey's commitment to NATO, and the number of global issues on which there was agreement increased with time. Both called for early end to the war in Vietnam, for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, for the strengthening of detente, and for the convening of a World Disarmament Conference.

On the Cyprus question Turkey found the U.S.S.R. a major source of support until 1974. The Turkish military intervention in 1974 and the fall of the military regime in Athens, however, changed Turkey's favored position. Fearing NATO control of the island, the Soviet Union joined UN calls for the dismantling of foreign bases on Cyprus and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the island and she proposed an international conference for a settlement.

On the other hand, economic relations dominated the normalization process for a long time. Soviet credits to Turkey were among the largest made available to any developing country, which underscores the significance of Turkey in Soviet estimations in general.<sup>54</sup> And restoration of confidence necessarily began with better economic relations. In 1960s and 1970s several of the short-term objectives have been achieved. The Declaration of the Principles of Good Neighborliness, signed in April 1972, and the Political Document on the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Co-operation, drafted in 1975 and signed in June 1978, have come to stand as proof that the level of mutual confidence achieved so far allows for political as well as economic contacts.

Nearly fifteen years of official contacts, technical assistance and the absence of intimidation led Prime Minister Ecevit to declare, on 15 May 1978 in London, that the Soviet Union was not a threat to Turkey. Elaborating his statement later, he explained that the Soviet Union had not shown any aggressive behavior towards Turkey for years, which therefore resulted in the emergence of mutual confidence between the two countries.<sup>55</sup>

These good neighborhood relations continued in 1980s, and there wasn't any major conflicts between two countries. Actually in late 1980s the Soviet

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<sup>54</sup> Larrabee, Stephen, *Balkan Security*, 1977.

<sup>55</sup> *Milliyet*, Turkish newspaper, 15 September 1978.

Union was dealing with its internal and Warsaw Pact problems. So, without any conflicts, especially economic relations continued to improve.

*c. Greece: Ally or Rival?*

The Greek and Turkish peninsula share a strategic unity imposed by the Aegean Sea. And in the postwar era, the Truman Doctrine led Turkey and Greece to close cooperation. Their sense of common destiny was also enhanced by the communist threat in Greece and by Soviet demands on Turkey. The extension of the NATO to the Aegean sealed their bilateral relationship with a multilateral engagement.

In the late 1950s, however, the Cyprus issue and later the dispute over territorial waters and the continental shelf reflected unnatural and dangerous strategic separatism in their perceptions of respective national interests in the Aegean. These two major problems also have implications for both countries' extra-regional relations. Historically, the diplomacy of European powers and now NATO allies, has been governed by a tendency to juxtapose policies toward Turkey and Greece.

Since the emergence of Cyprus as an independent state, the relations of the U.S. with Turkey have been deeply affected by American concerns for Greece. Many Turks fear that the Greek lobby in Washington has brought public sympathy for greece to bear on U.S. positions on the Cypriot problem.

In addition to Cyprus issue, and territorial waters and continental shelf problem in Aegean sea, militarization of the Aegean islands by Greece, the

American aid which has to be pegged to a 7:10 ratio between Greece and Turkey, minority problems, and unbelievable arms race between two allies, Turkey's Fourth (Aegean) Army which was created in response to Greek moves to the Eastern Aegean dominated the relations between Turkey and Greece in 1960s and 1970s.

Differences over the Aegean and Cyprus stem from a deep-rooted Greek conviction that the jurisdiction of Greece extends over the entire Aegean Sea and even over Cyprus, but that of Turkey does not go beyond its territorial waters.<sup>56</sup> This perspective has inevitably led the Greeks to view any Turkish concern beyond that line, such as the seabed delimitation or the rights of Turkish Cypriots, as an aggressive attitude.

Turkey has no claims on any Greek territory; a fact which the Turkish leaders has made clear on many occasions. Turkish governments have always maintained the belief that both countries have interests in each other's welfare and security. Accordingly, they welcome any improvement in U.S.-Greek defense cooperation as a contribution to the strengthening of NATO's Southern Region. For the same reason, in 1980, Turkey allowed Greece's return to the military organization of NATO without reciprocal assurance that Ankara's conditions concerning the application of the Rogers Plan and a final solution of the command and control problems should be fulfilled by Athens. What Turkey cannot accept,

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Chipman, John, *NATO's Southern Allies*, 1988.

however, is the establishment of trilateral links between Turkey, Greece and the U.S. on defense issues that are hostage to the specifics of the Greek-Turkish dispute.

In 1980s, the Turkish Government led by Ozal was cautious about overstressing the disputes between Turkey and Greece. Turkish leaders believed that the development of economic relations between Turkey and Greece would generate an atmosphere of cooperation which would improve choices for dispute settlement. To this affect, the Turkish government has abolished the visa requirement for Greeks wanting to visit Turkey.

But in response, what the Greek government did was to claim that the Turkish attempts were the main threat to Greece. On the other hand, Greece became one of the main obstacles on the way to the full-membership of EC. These two different approaches didn't solve the problems. And the Aegean crisis, in March 1987, has highlighted how easily and quickly the persisting tensions between Turkey and Greece could lead to war between these two NATO allies. It also showed that without the creation of a climate of mutual confidence in Cyprus and Aegean issues, real peace in NATO's Southern Flank is far away. Another point in Turkish-Greek relations is their common destiny. Up to the Greek's membership of EC both countries did apply and became the members of European organizations such as NATO, European Council. But Greek's membership of EC and later membership of WEU split their common destiny. And now, Greece have more advantages than Turkey in European affairs.

*d. Middle East*

After the war, Arab nationalism, socialism and anti-westernism developed strongly, at the same time as Turkey was seized by fear of the Soviet Union. The national pre-occupations and central concerns of Turkey and the Arab states were far apart, and specific points of difference soon emerged. For the Arabs the conflict with Israel assumed the highest priority, while for Turkey defense arrangements with the West seemed all important. Though Turkey had originally opposed the partition of Palestine, she subsequently became the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949.

As already noted, Turkey further antagonized the radical Arabs when she joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and because she sided with conservative Arab forces in the 1950s, radical regimes like Egypt and Syria became the most virulent critics of Turkey. The isolation in which Turkey found herself in 1964 over the Cyprus question hurt most when she was snubbed by all the Arab countries except Saudi Arabia.

Public opinion began to insist on establishing friendly ties with the Arab states. This meant improving inter-state relations, a change of stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict and distancing Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East from that of the U.S. So, in the spring of 1967 Turkey declared that the American bases could not be used in any conflict involving the Middle Eastern countries to dispel Arab fears and memories of 1958 American intervention in Lebanon. The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 encouraged Turkey to take an openly pro-Arab stand for the first

time. Bilateral relations with the PLO were established in 1975. Turkey participated in the first Islamic Conference in 1969 and its subsequent meetings.

Following the oil embargo in 1973, economic relations became the focus of attention. The objectives were to secure the oil, if possible on easy payment terms, to attract some of the new petrodollars for investment in Turkey, and to increase exports to oil-producing Arab countries. Turkey share of trade with the Middle East increased from about 9% in the mid-1960s to around 40% in mid-1980s.<sup>57</sup>

Iran, Iraq and Syria have a special importance for Turkey. These countries as neighbor also played important role for the security of Turkey. Iranian revolution of 1979, and Syria and Iraq's support to some separatist groups against Turkey affected the relations especially in 1980s. On the other hand Turkey's mediator role in Iran-Iraq war was important issue in Turkey's relations towards Middle East.

These developments simply indicated trends and possibilities. Religious and cultural affinities have not yet provided a steady basis for cooperation, despite Turkey's efforts to focus Arab attention on regional investment and trade. Turkey also discovered that she has to stress the political factor instead of merely concentrating on economic issues.

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<sup>57</sup>

Barchard, David, *Turkey and the West*, 1985.

## **V. NEW ENVIRONMENT**

### **A. GENERAL VIEW**

Since 1947 there was so much flux. In late 1980s, East-West and intra-NATO relations were undergoing change precipitated by many factors but in particular the process of reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The movement towards democratization and the rejection of communism in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and East Germany, and the more qualified rejection in Romania and Bulgaria, have taken place with the acquiescence of President Gorbachev.

When combined with the on-going process of Arms Control, the unification of Germany and the uncertain future of the Warsaw Pact, it appeared that the divisions that have so dominated Europe, setting Alliance against Alliance, since the beginning of the Cold War, were in the process of withering away in 1990.

On the other hand, in addition to concrete problem--Arab-Israeli conflict--invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 showed us the on-going uncertainties in the Middle East. Former Soviet Republics which were gaining their independence, became the center of the interests in the world politics. Finally, the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 were others steps on the way to the New World Order which is led by the U.S.

Therefore, the Russian danger has gone away, until and unless Russia reassembles the economic strength, and the will to make another bid for the control of Europe. And there is economic friction, and bad temper between the winners of the cold war--America, Europe and Japan.<sup>58</sup>

Eastern Asia astonishingly contains both the last remnants of defeated Marxism and the world's most efficient examples of victorious capitalism, but no great crisis between them is in prospect; Eastern Asia's ideological wars were won and lost a generation ago. Only a nuclear North Korea might make that untrue. Southern Asia may have to live through an attempt by India to become the local superpower, but the new world order can probably contain that. Latin America and Africa, after communism and apartheid, at last have a chance to concentrate on their enormous private business.

That leaves only one large stretch of the world notably liable to produce turmoil and mayhem on a large scale in the coming 15-20 years; the appropriately crescent-shaped piece of territory that starts in the steppes of Kazakhstan and curves south and west through the Gulf and Suez to the north coast of Africa. This part of the world and the Middle East are the potential zone of turbulence for a depressing variety of reasons such as economic problems, undemocratic governments, security of oil, territorial claims, etc.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> "A Survey of Turkey," *The Economist*, 14 December 1991.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

Balkans is another scene that is full of ethnic conflicts and minority problems. The on-going civil war in Yugoslavia shows the danger for the security and stability in Europe. The problems of this sort of world are likely to cause difficulties for the democracies of Europe and America. What about Turkey? If we look at the world map and analyze the developments, we see that Turkey sits at the center of the possible next cold war.

#### **B. THE FUTURE OF NATO**

The world today, particularly Europe, is to be sharply contrasted to the period of the cold war when two alliances faced each other across a divided Europe with the ever-present possibility of war by accident if not by design. It would be impossible in these dramatically transformed times to expect NATO to remain unchanged. It must be pointed out that many of the changes in Europe would not have taken place without it.

Actually NATO began to transform itself a few years ago. With the events in Eastern Europe and The Soviet Union moving so quickly, the London Summit of 5-6 July 1990 produced the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance." And later on 7-8 November 1991 in Rome, the Alliance's new strategic concept was agreed by the Heads of State and Governments of NATO countries.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, 7 November 1991.

However, there are many debates about the future of NATO. But the most likely solution for the new role of NATO, which is in implementation now, can be explained in three categories:

- New strategic concept,
- Relations with Central and Eastern Europe, and
- Reinforcement of the European pillar within the alliance.

#### 1. New Strategic Concept

According to the new strategic concept accepted at Rome meeting in November 1991, the political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the cold war period has been overcome. But the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. On the other hand, the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security. This means that the East is not the only threat, but other political, economic and military uncertainties that might cause new regional conflicts and affect the interests and security of NATO countries. And the most likely regions are the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East.

Some Middle Eastern countries with their developed weapons and unstable governments are possible source of future conflicts in the region. They may threaten the NATO security with their long-range and powerful weapons, or the security of oil that the West needs may be in danger because of these conflicts.

**Because the West believes that an effort to cut the oil lifeline of Western Europe is as great a threat to the security of NATO as a military attack against a NATO member.<sup>61</sup>**

**While European defense remains NATO's core mission, so-called out-of-area security cooperation may soon become the cutting edge of NATO's mission. According to the people who argue for this new role of NATO, to cope with these problems, NATO must have the capacity to reconstruct its defense as new risks arise, using the enhanced warning time that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe has created. In the Europe of tomorrow, military forces will be less part and parcel of a combat strategy designed principally for the ultimate eventually of all-out war than instruments of crisis prevention and crisis management. The Alliance's ability to respond to strategic surprise will be critical.**

**People who stand for these ideas also suggest that in a more peaceful Europe the integration of NATO forces is still necessary. Because multi-national units will demonstrate the alliance's solidarity and resolve, even at reduced levels. Integration will also be essential if NATO is to preserve the capacity to respond quickly to new risks with well-trained, well-equipped forces.**

**For this new concept, the Gulf War was a good exercise. Even though there were many non-NATO forces, the outcomes of the crisis and war were successful. An integrated alliance force could bring even more successful results.**

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<sup>61</sup> Nixon, Richard, "Is America a Part of Europe?" *National Review*, 2 March 1992.

## **2. Relations with Central and Eastern Europe**

These countries wish to form closer ties with NATO. Indeed, the Alliance took the lead at its London Summit in 1990 by inviting them to establish diplomatic liaison with NATO headquarters, and in early 1992 it was accomplished.<sup>62</sup>

This is not a seeking for the shift of balance or an extension of military borders to the East. But NATO wants them to be constructive partners with an important contribution to make a more cooperatively conceived security equation in Europe. This attempt will make Europe more secure.

## **3. Reinforcement of the European Pillar Within the Alliance**

This is a concept that has been talked about for a long time, practically since the inception of the alliance. Now, however, two powerful forces make its creation an urgent necessity; there is the prospect of a significant reduction in U.S. stationed forces in Europe which will shift a greater defense burden on to the shoulders of the European allies; and there is the prospect of a European political union which will also lead to a security and most likely even defense identity.

At this point let's look at what the powerful NATO members think about this. The U.S. is planning to reduce its defense expenditures. Reduced U.S. forces will help this decision. On the other hand, the U.S. doesn't want to relinquish its leadership in the world politics. NATO was a good instrument to do this. In a way it was the only important tie between the U.S. and Europe, and it provided U.S

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<sup>62</sup> Jane's *NATO Handbook*, 1991/1992.

presence in Europe for years. To dissolve the NATO and go back home is not what the U.S. leaders want. The Americans want Europeans to do more in their own defense but not in competition with NATO.

France favors building an independent European force to serve a future independent European foreign, security and defense policy. Germany also favors common European policies in these areas, but thinks they can be had without undermining NATO. Hence its recent joint initiative with France setting out the goal of a common European defense policy, centered on the Western European Union (WEU), which works in association with NATO. To Germany this is a way to bring France closer militarily to NATO.

To Britain, which is deeply skeptical of a common European defense policy and is determined to keep America in Europe, the Franco-German idea is a threat to NATO's foundations. Unlike France and Germany, which see the WEU as the future defense arm of the EC in association with NATO, Britain and Italy have proposed that the WEU in effect becomes the European pillar of NATO in association with the EC.<sup>63</sup>

As we see, several different approaches to the European pillar have emerged. But the most probable outcome is the use of the WEU as a bridge between NATO and the EC, at least in the short term. By way of this, NATO will be kept as the principal form for the determination of Western security policy, and non-EC

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<sup>63</sup> "NATO: Life After Threat," *The Economist*, 2 November 1991.

countries (such as Turkey) will be involved in the decision making of future European security and defense identity.

The Alliance will also continue to adapt over time to reflect the role of a European security and defense identity, as it emerges, within its own structures. For instance, the multi-national units and Rapid Reaction Force that NATO will create, according to its new strategic concept, will not only enhance the European contribution to the alliance but also allow the process of European integration to play a greater role. It is essential that those U.S. forces remaining in Europe not be excluded from these units. So, the connection between WEU and NATO will ensure this.

As a result, this solution will preserve NATO's current integrated structure with its transatlantic dimension in the defense of its members' territory, and also enhances Europe's solidarity and actual military capabilities to act out-of-area in defense of common alliance interests. And the alliance's version will be a new Europe whole and free with a future European architecture based on four principal constituent parts; NATO, EC/WEU, CSCE and Council of Europe.

### C. THE CHANGING THREAT TO WESTERN SECURITY

The last few years have been seen by many observers as the period when peace broke out throughout the world. Closer examination of world events, however, clearly shows this was not the case and that the security of the West is still threatened, albeit in different ways.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) major armed conflicts were being waged in 32 locations in the world during 1989. SIPRI defines a major armed conflict controversially as "a prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments or of one government and an organized opposition force, including the use of manufactured weapons and incurring battle-related deaths of at least 1000 persons."<sup>64</sup>

A more concise definition is the one used by Paul Wilkinson and the Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, in London, as it excludes conflicts that are predominantly "terrorist." According to their definition there were 18 conflicts being waged throughout the world, mostly Third World countries, in civil wars, guerilla wars and other violence.

Terrorism persists in at least three NATO countries on a more or less permanent basis; the U.K. (IRA), Spain (ETA), and in Turkey (PKK). However, other countries have also suffered from international terrorism, particularly that which is generated from the Middle East. And countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya were always at the top of the list which shows the countries that supported the terrorist activities actively. These kind of countries can always also threat the security of Middle Eastern oil. On the other hand, the end of Super Power rivalries or confrontations throughout the world will not necessarily diminish wars, though the ability of some local dictators in the Middle East to use leverage to draw in Super

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<sup>64</sup> Jane's NATO Handbook, 1991/1992.

Power arms and support to underpin the regime will sharply decrease. So, great efforts will be required in this area of increased cooperation to prevent local and regional crises, and if that fails, to stop them spreading.

Because these unstable governments and powerful military forces are possible actors for the conflict in the Middle East. So, the Middle East remains area of continuing Alliance interest. These are why the Western alliance accepted its new strategic concept (which accepts out-of-area threats and interventions) that gives them the capability of intervention in the Middle East.

#### D. TURKEY IN THIS NEW ENVIRONMENT

##### 1. General View

Many people thought that the end of the cold war made Turkey matter even less than previously. The Turks were mildly useful in the "containment strategy" and the defeat of communism. But that has been achieved, so the Turks can now return to the periphery where they belong. This viewpoint is culturally arrogant and geopolitically blind.<sup>65</sup>

To understand why Turkey matters so much, even today, one must start by looking at a map. Turkey has a strange collection of neighbors--the former Soviet Union (or CommonWealth Countries), Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece and Bulgaria. Just as that role (mentioned earlier) seemed to be diminishing to insignificance, along with the Soviet threat, Iraq obligingly gave Turkey the chance to prove how useful

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<sup>65</sup> "A Survey of Turkey," *The Economist*, 14 December 1991.

**useful they could be to the defense of the West. Later possible roles and influences of Turkey on the Central Asian Republics, which are mostly Turkish originated and muslim, especially in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, made Turkey more important in world politics. In addition to these, Turkish and muslim minorities in Balkans are also looking for Turkey's recognition and help.**

**On the other hand, continuing relations with both European countries and the Middle East countries made Turkey's another role, being a bridge between Europe and the muslim world, to become sound.**

## **2. Turkey and Her External Environment**

**As we noted earlier, following the advances toward Super power nuclear parity and re-emergence of specific regional problems such as Cyprus, Turkey has placed a greater emphasis on pursuing a broader conception of security. NATO's neglect of the Southern Region and a growing perception that the Alliance was not fully aware of Turkey's particular security problems encouraged the trend towards strengthening Turkey's regional defense interests.**

**Turkish security and foreign policy has undoubtedly evolved to take a far greater account of regional considerations and the development of political, economic and diplomatic relations with her Middle Eastern neighbors. Conscious of the endemic instability of the Middle East, Turkey has worked assiduously to secure peace in the region. For example, she played a mediator role in Iran-Iraq War, and remained neutral during the war despite violations of her airspace and territory by both countries.**

However, the Iran-Iraq War highlighted one of Turkey's enduring problems, namely the establishment of closer relations with Middle Eastern states without becoming embroiled in regional conflicts or heightening Western anxieties of an Islamic resurgence.

*a. Relations with EC*

Turkish efforts to promote diplomatic, environmental and economic initiatives in the Middle East forms only one element of Turkish foreign policy. A central objective of Turkish foreign policy remains EC membership and an integral part of the application process has entailed the projection of a positive image in the West.

The European Commission has decided that negotiations on Turkish membership of the EC should not commence before 1993 suggesting that Turkey's present economic, political and social standards were incompatible with those of the EC. It is by no means certain that Turkey's application for membership of the EC will be secured by her stance against Iraq as issues such as Cyprus, relations with Greece (EC member Greece's positive response is necessary for Turkey's membership), human rights and the state of the economy could all have a bearing on the final decision.

*b. Relations with the U.S.*

Turkey remains at the margins of the process towards European integration but relations with the U.S. have improved dramatically especially as a

result of the Gulf Crisis. U.S.-Turkish relations were already improving even prior to the outbreak of the Gulf War. The shelving of a Senate resolution to designate 24 April as a national day of remembrance for the Armenians was particularly significant in this process. Temporary restrictions were imposed on U.S. military activities in Turkey after the resolution cleared the Senate judiciary committee in October 1989.

However, the U.S. has remained the major supplier of security assistance to Turkey and aid levels were increased in the early 1980s. During the mid-1980s assistance levels were drastically reduced but since 1988 an improvement in the composition of security assistance was apparent as the grant portion of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) began to increase against the share of FMS credits. In FY91 Turkey received \$500 million in FMS grants, none as credits, \$50 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) and \$3.4 million from the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Turkey remains the third largest recipient of U.S. aid package.

In September 1990, the Turkish Government decided to extend the Defense and Economic Agreement (DECA). The decision to extend the DECA in conjunction with the extensive Turkish support for the allied forces in the Gulf has been reflected in an increase in security assistance. In FY91, Turkey received a supplemental \$200 million in ESF. In FY92 Turkey will receive \$625 million in FMS grants, \$75 million ESF and \$3.5 million in International Military Education and

Training. It is also evident that the maintenance of a fixed 10 to 7 ratio in U.S. aid to Turkey and Greece is under review.<sup>66</sup>

*c. Relations with the former Soviet Union*

In addition to the improvement in U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkey has intensified its economic, political and diplomatic contacts with the former U.S.S.R. Turkey and her NATO allies now face the challenge of dealing with the independent republics emerging from the former Soviet Union.

Since 1987 Soviet-Turkish trade more than tripled to \$1.8 billion in 1990. During President Ozal's visit to Moscow in March, 1991, to sign a new bilateral, cooperation agreement, negotiations concentrated on a wide range of joint ventures in banking, telecommunications and agriculture. Notwithstanding these advances, Turkey was acutely aware of the potentially destabilizing consequences of the U.S.S.R. And now Turkey is dealing with a number of independent republics emanating from the breakup of the U.S.S.R., because the population of the Central Asian Republics has close ethnic affinities with Turkey, and exceed 40 million.

This will bring certain advantages but also it raises a number potential problems. This area seems to be a potential market for Turkish goods. Also improved diplomatic relations will increase Turkey's power among these republics. But this developments fears the West and Western countries are getting anxious about emerging a possible pan-Turkism. Actually Turkey doesn't have an intention

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<sup>66</sup> *Jane's NATO Handbook, 1991/1992.*

in that way. But it becomes an alternative in Turkish foreign relations and makes Turkey more powerful in world politics. For example, in Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, Turkey pursued an active policy and this increased her influences on the Turkic republics. But this kind of developments are also a potential risk for Turkey to be involved any local and regional conflicts.

On the other hand, Turkey has also proposed the establishment of a Black Sea economic cooperation zone which could include the Caucasian Republics, Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria. This organization is another tool which gives Turkey economic and political advantages.

However, Turkey is still anxious about the developments in Russia which is dealing with her internal problems. Turkey's fears stem from the possible Russian nationalism and czarist policy that can wake again after the solution to her domestic problems like the U.S.S.R. did in interwar and postwar periods.

#### *d. Relations with the Middle East*

The Middle East is one of the important area in the Turkish foreign and security policies. Especially her Middle Eastern neighbors have the priorities in these relations. During the 1980s, economic and diplomatic relations increased dramatically. But Turkey's problems in the region have not been resolved following the conclusion of the Gulf War.

After the mediator role in the Iran-Iraq War, in the early stages of the Gulf Crisis, Turkey decided to block Iraq's main export pipeline across its southern territory. Turkey was dependent on the closed pipeline for 50 percent of

her oil imports for domestic use. On the other hand Turkey lost an estimated \$1 billion in annual exports to Kuwait and Iraq. This was compounded by further losses in the building, transportation and tourist industries. The burden shouldered by the Turkish economy as a consequence of the sanctions is between \$7 to 10 billion.<sup>67</sup>

In addition to the economic losses, Turkey's security was also affected. The authority vacuum in Northern Iraq and later Iraqi President Saddam's support to the terrorist organization PKK, increased the terrorist actions against Turkish territory. The Turkish Government took some political, economic and military measures against these activities. Especially military measures have been criticized by the Western countries in terms of the human rights. While the same measures were taken against the IRA in the U.K. and ETA in Spain, western countries continue to criticize Turkey, some countries, even though they are NATO members, support the PKK action which is directly a threat Turkey's security and unity. But Turkey was and is very sensitive regarding her unity and experienced the damage of terrorism in pre-1980. So the Turkish Government continues to take the measures necessary for her security even though these kind of actions decline her credibility in the West.

While these developments damage the relations with Iraq, the same issues are also evident for Syria and Iran. The PKK also receive support from the Syrians, partly the legacy of longstanding territorial and ideological differences

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<sup>67</sup>

Ibid.

**between Turkey and Syria. Turkey has also concern that Iran could seek to exploit the PKK campaign as a means of promoting Islamic fundamentalism within Turkey.**

**While Turkey continues to maintain economic relations with Iran and improve the relations within the Regional Development Organization (RCD), environmental and economic issues could lead to further deterioration in relations with Iraq and Syria. Both Iraq and Syria are dependent on Turkey's Greater Anatolian Project (GAP), a complex of dams that will harness the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to provide irrigation and power to an underdeveloped region and will make doubled Turkey's agricultural production.**

**Turkey did open the gates of two diversion tunnels in her giant Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates river on February 1990. This released 500 cubic meters of water per second across its southern border to Iraq and Syria downstream. Iraq and Syria had pressed for a reduction in the filling period to reduce the damage to their economies and despite the diversion of the water, the issue remains a source of contention. Although Turkish officials have explained that this project will not be used as political and military pressure tools, Iraqi and Syrian officials are anxious about the developments in Turkey.**

**On the other hand these countries' large amount of military expenditures is another reason why Turkish leaders are interested in with these countries closely. Unexpected crisis may cause big losses in the region because of the large amount of weapons.**

*e. Relations with the Balkans*

The Turkish Government has made strenuous efforts to initiate regional cooperation in the Balkans. Stability in the Balkans remains an unlikely prospect given the apparent disintegration of Yugoslavia, the growth of opposition in Albania, enduring problems in Turkish-Greek relations, however improving friendship in Turkish-Bulgarian relations.

The two NATO allies were on the verge of hostilities in March 1987, over disputed oil resources in the Aegean. Conflict was averted and the Davos initiative of winter 1988 seemed to herald a new era in Turkish-Greek relations. Despite some advances, both sides failed to deal with issues of substance and they even differ on what is negotiable.

While NATO's defense in the Eastern Mediterranean weakens because of the conflicts between these two countries, the Cyprus issue continues to plague Turkish-Greek relations. Greece uses the Cyprus and Aegean problems as an obstacle to Turkey's relationship with the West. Greece doesn't lift her veto to EC membership of Turkey. But Turkey had lifted a similar veto while Greece was returning to NATO's military part. Now the Turkish leaders remember the necessity of long-term decision making and how the strategic decisions must be made.

Turkey's relations with her Balkan neighbor, Bulgaria, have followed a similar pattern dominated by mutual animosity. Relations between the two nations have been characterized by an intense historical rivalry pre-dating the postwar division of Europe. Bulgarian treatment of the ethnic Turkish minority which

comprises about 10 percent of the population soured relations during the 1980s. In June 1989, thousands of ethnic Turks left Bulgaria following an intensification of Bulgarianisation policies.

The forced resignation of Zhivkov, the liberalization of the Communist Party and the progress made towards democracy in Bulgaria, have all served to improve bilateral relations. Recently, high level of military and other official visits were exchanged. And friendship between Turkey and Bulgaria continues to improve.

On-going disintegration in Yugoslavia is another interest area for Turkey because of the muslim and Turkish minorities. Turkey recognized all new independent republics and pursue an active policy to keep her influence in the region.

### **3. Turkey's Domestic Scene**

Turkey, today, is a working democracy. According to the West, Turkey is still weak in the civil rights department but the election on October 20th, 1991, showed that multi-party choice is vigorously back in operation, and the chances of another military intervention are small and diminishing.

Turkey also has a fairly promising economy. Despite the electoral economic policies in the late 1980s and the effects of Gulf War, her national income is growing cheerfully faster than her population, and since 1980 the Turks have abandoned their old fascination with economic self-sufficiency and the merits of state-run industry. There is now a bad case of inflation and too many dead-loss state

companies. Actually the new economics of 1980s did end the old autarky. Exports went up briskly with the depreciation of the Turkish lira and export subsidies; so did imports, as quotas were abolished and tariffs slashed. Foreign investment rose as controls were loosened.

Partly because of the state's chunk lost so much money, the budget deficit grew and grew after the mid-1980s. Although the economy also grew--by 4.6% a year on average through the 1980s, twice the population growth--this failed to do much for Turkey's high unemployment, even though real wages fell sharply. Worst 1980s never really got a grip on Turkey's frightening inflation.<sup>68</sup>

Disappointed that the 1980s did not produce a complete cure, some Turks are now looking in an other direction. While debates are going on EC membership, its advantages and disadvantages, Turkey's economy is getting ready to turn to her racial and religious friends. But the break-up of the Soviet Union offers the Turks no general alternative to what they set out to do in 1980s. Either Turkey makes her economy properly competitive, or Turkey sinks back permanently into the world's third division.

On the other hand, Turkey's political structure is different from the 1980s. With the abolishment of the laws which ban the religious and communist parties, Turkish political life became more diversified. People and press began to talk about every subject. For example, the downsizing of the Turkish Armed Forces and the

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<sup>68</sup>

"A Survey of Turkey," *The Economist*, 14 December 1991.

defense expenditures became popular subjects. However, a coalition government was the result of the last election on October 20th, 1991. It has two different meanings. It was proof of a low chance of military intervention, and a working multi-party system. Because Turkish politicians managed to change the government by election. But for some people it was a sign of weak coalition governments in the late 1970s. So far the new government is doing well on the subjects that are critised by the West such as human rights.

Another issue, terrorism is also makes people to remember the days full of unstabilities and uncertainties in the 1970s, even though these terrorist activities are different than the pre-1980s. This situation also decreases Turkey's credibility in the international arena. But Turkey experienced these events before. So Turkish leaders are aware of the risks and disadvantages of these threats. What they have to do is to analyze the past and present situation and select the best alternatives.

#### **E. TURKEY'S CHANGING ROLE IN NATO**

During the cold war period, Turkey's contribution to NATO has been on the size of its armed forces, the second largest in the Alliance, and the provision of vital bases and logistical support. Turkey's role in NATO has largely centered on attempts to contain Warsaw Pact forces in the Southern Region and prevent unimpeded Soviet access to the Mediterranean through control of the Turkish Straits.

Given the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact scenarios involving an assault on the Turkish Straits are no longer credible but the importance of the Southern Region

could well increase as NATO's strategy is no longer predicated on the need for a massive concentration of forces in central Europe. Turmoil in the Middle East and Balkans directly impinges on the security of the Southern Region and Turkey may be one of the NATO countries most directly affected by sources of instability emanating from the new international order.

It used to be said that Turkey's value to the West was purely military. But it was not true. Because Turkey could do little during the cold war to help hold off the Soviets on the vital central front, in Germany. Turkey could offer vital bases or divert the Soviet forces or be physical obstacle to Russian access to the Middle East. Maybe because of this, western NATO members didn't care about the Southern Region Countries' military strength and armed forces' modernization.

When we look at the new strategic concept of NATO, we see that new threats are expected from regional conflicts. And the Middle East is the most likely source of threat for the Western countries. This means NATO's vital central front is shifting from Germany to the Southern Region. Turkey, as the only NATO country bordering with the Middle Eastern Countries, is going to be the central front. Therefore Turkey's importance for NATO will increase. Theoretically this is true. But in reality, past experiences show that the West will remember Turkey only in case of any threat to the West, at that time Turkey will be an important front. If the threat comes to only Turkey from the South, the West may not react properly, or they may evaluate it as not a real threat.

On the other hand, according to the present assumptions, Turkey is still important for the West. Hence, NATO countries must increase their military and economic aid to Turkey to keep the central front strong. But, the developments are not that way. When we look at the new arrangements in Europe, EC member countries are aiming at a whole and free Europe. They have every kind of institution, including defense organization WEU, to accomplish this. Then what is the use of NATO among this organizations? It seems NATO's role here is temporary, because WEU/EC members are still in a transition period. Their defense capabilities and organizations are not organized to cope with out-of-area conflicts which are critical for the West, such as the security of the Middle Eastern oil.

For the U.S., NATO is essential to the U.S. presence in Europe. In case of any out-of-area intervention, the U.S. forces will be the main element. Since the U.S. is a non-WEU member, she can't join the defense forces of Europe theoretically. So, NATO will be necessary to keep the U.S in Europe, and get her help for the out-of-area interventions, at least in the short run. When the EC/WEU become self-sufficient, new arrangements can be made.

As we see, for the time being NATO is still important for the interests of the West. Until WEU becomes a powerful military organization, NATO will defend its interests in out-of-area threats. It is more beneficial for the EC members not to dissolve NATO rather than increasing the number of the EC members. This means they will decide whether there is a threat to the West. Non-EC members of NATO, will not have more effects in these arguments. So Turkey's importance will increase

or the West will remember Turkey only in case of any threat from the Middle East to the West.

So, Turkey can't be an important NATO member unless she becomes an EC member. But there are many obstacles for this membership. The first one is that Turkey's economic and democratic situations are not at the same level with the West. On the other hand, Turkey's military capabilities and modernization level of her armed forces are also not at the same level with the other NATO members. If we follow the same logic, Turkey cannot be a NATO member, because to do the given duties, she must be at the level of NATO standards.

This simple explanation shows the two faces of the West. But Turkey believes that this kind of organization requires mutual confidence between the members. Each member must respect each others' rights and security, and each others' needs. But this was not the case in NATO. Turkey will always remember the Cyprus affairs. On the other hand, these kind of events continue to occur. For example, in early 1992 the relations between Turkey and Germany deteriorated, because Germany didn't accept the PKK actions as terrorist actions and criticized Turkey because of her measures against this terrorist organization, and cut the military aid.

This also raises the question of who will decide whether there is a threat to any member. In reality, only a country herself can analyze her situation and decide whether there is a threat or not. After this, other members must respect to this decision and support her actions.

However, since Turkey experienced these kind of events, she has attempted to increase her military capabilities by her own defense industry. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Turkey began modernizing her armed forces. While Turkey's security policy continues to be based on NATO, with a foreign debt of \$49 billion and an inflation rate of around 60 percent, Turkey faces a severe challenge in seeking to modernize its armed forces.<sup>69</sup> But it was during the last decade that a major drive was launched to create a viable indigenous defense industry. This process was designed to alleviate the burden on the defense budget by increasing military exports and also to reduce Turkey's dependence on foreign security assistance.

As a consequence of this policy, Turkey will have a chance to decide on her own foreign and security policies, which will provide her freedom in her actions in the world politics. It will help Turkish Government to be ready for any unexpected deteriorations in the relations between Turkey and her NATO ally.

#### F. THE CHANGING THREAT TO TURKEY

The analysis of the new environment shows that the Soviet threat to Turkey also has ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Actually, as noted earlier, Turkey has claimed in late 1970s that the Soviet Union was not a threat anymore to Turkey. It is now accepted by all countries too.

This doesn't mean that Turkey does not have any more security problems. In addition to the explanations related with the developments in Europe, Balkans,

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<sup>69</sup> Jane's NATO Handbook, 1991/1992.

Central Asia and Middle East, if we look at the strange neighbors of Turkey, we will see that Turkey is at the center of many current conflicts. All of them have different importance for Turkey.

While the Turkish-Bulgarian relations are improving, Turkish-Greek relations keep its special place in the Turkish foreign and security policies.

But the developments in the Middle East are getting more important for Turkey. Increasing military expenditures and unstable governments in the Middle East makes Turkish leaders anxious about the possible conflicts in this region. Especially her Middle Eastern neighbors Iraq, Syria and Iran are the countries spending more money in weapons acquisition.

Also their support for the terrorist organization PKK's actions against Turkey, makes Turkey more sensitive to the relations with these countries and force Turkey to take into account these countries while planning her new security policy. These terrorist actions are directly a threat to Turkey's unity and security, and to all citizens' safety.

On the other hand, while Middle Eastern oil keeps its importance for all countries, water is becoming another problem in the Middle East. According to speculations, the next war in the Middle East will be for water. Turkey's neighbors, Iraq and Syria, rely on Turkey, to provide water for their needs, because two important rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, originate in Turkish territory. Also Turkey is building large dams on these rivers according to her GAP project. This project is increasing the tension between Turkey and her southern neighbors. So. a

**possible conflict due to water in the Middle East will likely involve Turkey too. This is another example of possible threats to Turkey.**

**Actually Turkish officials claimed on several occasions that they don't have any intention to use the water as a weapon, but there are still ongoing speculations. President Ozal proposed a project called Peace Pipeline which will go from Turkey all the way down to Saudi Arabia, to show Turkey's contribution to the peace in the region. But so far there is no official agreement.**

**These developments require more emphasis on the Middle Eastern neighbors of Turkey while Turkish decision makers making their security policies in the New World Order.**

## **VI. NATO: A MISFIT?**

### **A. THE STRATEGY EVALUATION**

In strategy making process, it is very important to understand past and present situations. Then you can decide which direction to go. In this paper, up to now, we analyzed the past relations between Turkey and NATO, and environmental effects on decision makers. Later we looked at the new environment and what kind of future prospects there are today.

This overview of the past and present trends in Turkish security policy and thinking should support the view that there is indeed very intimate linkages and interdependencies between national policy, internal developments and the international system.

As noted earlier, the main reason for the Turkey's membership of NATO was to get political and military support against Soviet threats. Along with this goal, there were also other goals such as to ensure the continuity of the aid which stem from the Truman Doctrine, to get the political support for the establishment of democratic institutions, and of course Turkey's wish to be a European country and considered among the Western countries.

Turkey joined NATO after two years of lobbying for admittance, and an earlier rebuff. After this, we saw that the firm political cooperation with the U.S. and

Britain against the Soviet Union, together with NATO's military defense strategies, decreased the Soviet pressures on Turkey. While the West's political and military supports were going on, economic relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union led to the improvement of the mutual confidence between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

By the late 1970s, Turkey was claiming that there was no Soviet threat anymore to Turkey. With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and the dissolving of the Soviet Union on the last days of 1991, this threat has ended completely. This was a success for Turkey and NATO. They accomplished the main goal of the NATO defense organization. It also shows that Turkey's membership to NATO, and its NATO based security policy was the right choice for Turkey in 1950s. This defense strategy was consistent with the Turkey's security goal (the principle of consistency).

In terms of political, economic and military aid, we can say that was also accomplished, although the error was not to determine specific goals; that is, to what level Turkey's needs would be met by NATO. Since there wasn't any definite plan, other members became developed countries but Turkey remains a developing country which still needs external economic and military aids. Her armed forces feel deeply the need for modernization.

To depend on allies' aid and accept what they could offer has slowed down Turkey's development. On the other hand, there were conflicts and interruptions in giving aid to Turkey, especially due to the Cyprus conflicts. Turkey experienced

isolation in world politics, when even the ally countries left Turkey alone. These were the inconsistencies in their NATO based strategy.

Another inconsistent policy stemmed from the NATO based strategy was Turkey's Middle East policy. Turkey was sometimes forced or sometimes felt that she had to pursue a parallel policy with the West in the Middle Eastern issues. But later Turkey felt the necessity of diversifying her foreign policy and the Middle East took a special place in her foreign policy.

A strategy must represent an adaptive response to the external environment (the principle of consonance). In the cold war era, while Warsaw Pact was changing its strategies against the West, NATO also tried to adapt its defense strategies by taking into account the new Soviet strategies and new weapons systems. NATO as an organization was successful in adapting to developments in its environments. But we can not say that each member felt the same confidence.

In Turkey's case, during the early years of the membership of the alliance, there was some unease at possible discrepancies between the all-out strategy to be employed by NATO and Turkey's strategic requirements. Later also, the strategy of flexible response caused particular disquiet among segments of Turkish public opinion, since it could be taken to imply that large areas of the east of the country might be sacrificed without a fight in time of war. So, new adaptive strategies or matching the requirements of the environment was not a success from the perspective of Turkey's needs.

However, a strategy must provide for the creation and/or maintenance of a competitive advantage in the selected area of activity (the principle of advantage). From the perspective of Turkey, NATO as an integrated defense organization, could offer to Turkey a high level of development in her domestic defense industry, since NATO requires cooperation in defense.

But while other members were getting industrialized and modernized, they neither cooperate with Turkey in production, nor transferred their technology to Turkey. And Turkey is still in need of a domestic defense industry. In late 1970s and 1980s, there were Turkey's own attempts to establish defense industry after getting lessons from the Cyprus conflicts.

On the other hand, a strategy's purpose is to provide structure to the organization's goals and approaches to coping with its environment. It is up to members to carry out the tasks defined by strategy. A strategy that requires tasks to be accomplished which fall outside the realm of available or easily obtainable skills and resources cannot be accepted. It is either infeasible or incomplete (the principle of feasibility).

In the case of Turkey's NATO based strategy, Turkey's defense and her NATO obligations were almost entirely based on her own armed forces against possible Soviet attacks. But if we compare the Turkish Armed Forces with the Soviet's, we can't expect Turkey to stand against the Soviet Union successfully in a war. Actually, according to the NATO articles, if a member is attacked, the others will help her, but since Turkey experienced the opposite developments (remember the Johnson's

letter and arms embargo), to get that kind of help in case of danger for Turkey was doubtful. Turkey cannot trust the ally countries completely in this. So, from the defense perspective of Turkey against the Soviet Union by her armed forces, this strategy was infeasible to Turkey.

Another goal of Turkey was being among the European countries. Since 1952 Turkey has played a full part in most Western and European international institutions, from NATO to the OECD and to the Council of Europe. Through her membership, Turkey was introduced to the circle of the American-West European political and diplomatic partnership. NATO membership allowed for a continuous and spontaneous exchange of views between Turkey and her collective allies. The value of such diplomatic contacts in political, economic and cultural relations is inestimable; more than anything else, it has enabled Turkey to establish herself as a European power.

From Turkey's point of view, despite some psychological complications and ambiguities, which were most freely ventilated in Turkey in the 1960s, when freedom of discussion was at its greatest, involvement with the West would appear to have brought a range of benefits. Contact with advanced industrial societies remains the chief source of innovation and advance in Turkish society. So, Turkish people believe that they got some benefits from these relations.

All in all, we can say that Turkey, by joining NATO, has eliminated its Soviet threat, ensured the continuity of its aid (more or less), and enjoyed being among Western powers. Even though there were some seemingly inconsistent policies, not

being able to take some competitive advantages from the membership, and the infeasibility of military defense against the Soviet Union, NATO has contributed to Turkey's needs.

Now it is time to evaluate this strategy again according to the new environment which was analyzed earlier. To adapt a strategy to a new environment, first of all, we have to decide where to go, or what our goal is. For a defense strategy, the threat should be understood to decide what our goal is.

From the explanations in chapter V, we can conclude that the threat to NATO has changed since the communism and the Soviet Union has collapsed. Our analysis shows that the threat to NATO has shifted from the East (U.S.S.R.) to the South (Middle East). Actually there is no visible military threat from the Middle East to the alliance. But present tensions and potential conflicts led the Western alliance to take into account the Middle Eastern countries more seriously in the new strategic concept.

There is no specific threat in the military sense, but the Middle East is more dangerous than other regions due to the large amount of military expenditures of these countries, and unstable governments which can affect the security of oil that the West needs. So, this region is the highest on the list of threats to the West.

From the analysis, it is also obvious that the threat to Turkey is also from the South. In today's Turkey, the most important security issue is the terrorist actions in Southeastern Turkey. There are also some attempts to make these actions nationwide. Turkey experienced the terrorist activities in 1970s. But this time it is different.

These actions have external supporters like the 1970s'. However, now Turkish officials explain explicitly that the terrorist organization (PKK) is getting support from Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors--Iran, Iraq and Syria.

We analyzed in chapter V why these countries pursue this kind of policy. And also we saw how some ally countries (e.g. Germany) evaluate this situation. So, this terrorist action backed by the external actors is the most important threat to Turkey's security and unity today.

It seems that both NATO and Turkey expect the new threat from the South. But the contents of the threats are different. While the South becomes a threat to the West in case of any danger to the security of oil that the West needs or possible terrorist action against Westerns, the South is a direct threat to Turkey today due to these terrorist actions which may damage her security and unity.

For the West, the threat is a possible conflict, like the recent Gulf Crisis and War. On the other hand, Turkey is experiencing this terrorist threat today. And some NATO members don't accept this situation as a threat to Turkey like they didn't accept in case of Cyprus conflicts. It means there is not much mutual confidence between Turkey and ally countries. So in addition to these terrorist attacks, if there will be limited war between Turkey and any neighbors, Turkey may not get help from the alliance. The last forty years' experiences force Turkish leaders to think in this way. Because of this there is a great Turkish effort to establish her own defense industry, at least to be self-sufficient in some areas of this industry.

As we see, there are different views and opinions at the beginning of the formation of goals for a NATO based defense strategy between Turkey and ally countries. This situation stems from the differences of the felt threats. Even if they had a common threat, a NATO based strategy presented inconsistent policies for Turkey and doesn't offer any advantage. So it would be a mistake to expect more positive results for the benefits of Turkey from the NATO based strategy which has to present suitable policies for different threats in this new environment.

Another point which will affect the formation of Turkey's security policy is NATO's future role. From our analysis we see that it will have a temporary role in the near future. Until the West becomes a self-sufficient power and ready to play a super power role in the world politics, NATO will continue to serve. Since the West is planning for its future years (a defense policy without NATO, but under the control of EC/WEU) in a whole and free Europe, Turkish officials also must take into account these further developments. Since Turkey is not a member of EC and WEU, when the temporary role of NATO ends, Turkey will be out of European security policy. This is further evidence that the West does not take into considerations the felt threats to Turkey in this transition period. And as a result this will produce a poor defense cooperation.

## B. THESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED

To find out the answer of how the leadership of Turkey would decide whether Turkey should stay in NATO or not, first we analyzed the Turkey-NATO relations in a historical perspective, and then we answered the subsidiary questions.

The question--why did Turkey join NATO, was answered in chapter II. According to the analysis in this chapter Turkey was in need of external military, political and economic support to cope with the Soviet threats and her internal problems. So, NATO was the best alternative then according to the Turkish leaders.

Chapter III and IV give the answer of the question that how the membership of Turkey affected Turkey and NATO during the post war period. According to these explanations, Turkey and NATO was successful in eliminating the Soviet threat. But Turkey couldn't meet all of her expectations. The principles of the strategy evaluation also showed that except the elimination of the Soviet threat, NATO based strategy didn't solve the Turkey's problems.

The analysis of the new environment in chapter V revealed the new threats to Turkey and NATO, which is the answer of where does the primary threat to Turkey and NATO come from now. According to this, both expect the new threat from the South, but the contents of the threats are different. While any country in the Middle East could be a threat to Western Alliance, Turkey expect the new threat from her Middle Eastern neighbors--Iran,Iraq and Syria.

Another subsidiary question was whether it is still favorable for Turkey to be a NATO member. The analysis of the past and present environments, and future prospects show that NATO couldn't meet all of the Turkey's needs. And NATO's future role will be a temporary role on the way to the unification of Europe. According to the current developments regarding to the unification of Europe, Turkey doesn't have any place in this unification process. So Turkey cannot rely on the NATO for her future security policies.

All these answers helped us to figure out whether Turkey should stay in NATO or not, and what Turkey should do. The answer of this primary question is as follows in conclusion.

### C. CONCLUSION

In short, while the Turkish case is now in question, the whole concept of the viability of the NATO Alliance, as well as the concept of American protection of Western Europe, is also in question. The Turkish case is the only one example of the impact of changing conditions on Alliance credibility and cohesion.

The Turkish case is more complicated than the others, and local difficulties greater because Turkey's dependence on the U.S. covers the whole spectrum from economic to military matters, while the rest of Western Europe's dependence is largely confined to the military guarantee. What makes the Turkish case unique and points to the basic contradiction that is at the source of several of the major

problems is the fact that Turkey is in reality a developing country yet is also closely associated with the industrialized West.

However, Europeans have tended to emphasize economic, political and military cooperation as alternative ways to ensure the security of Europe. And the developments in the new environment show that this attempt will soon be real. So, Turkey must consider these developments while planning new policies.

What is certainly true in Turkey's case is that there are problems of domestic political stability and economic difficulties to be solved before security policy can be redefined. Turkey must discover where she is going. Only then can she give expression to a clear and logical security policy which derives from a confident foreign policy and a sense of knowing where Turkey fits into the overall scheme of things.

For the time being, it is not easy to cut all relations with NATO; and it is too simplistic to suggest that Turkey's turn towards the Middle East and Central Asian Republics is solely or even mainly a result of anti-Western sentiment. But the Turkish leaders must take into considerations the temporary role of NATO for the near future, and then plan the long range security policies. This will be also a transition period for Turkey like other Western countries.

Turkey's future policies will be shaped by her models of development. Because different models of development imply different alternatives for foreign and security policy. Those who propose development along the present mixed-economy model tend to see Turkey's ties with the West as a necessary element for Turkish security;


those who stress fundamentalist values propose a security structure based on Islamic concepts of social and defense organizations. On the other hand a centrally-planned economy for the development on the socialist model is not valid anymore for Turkey. Finally, for those whose point of departure is Turkey's systemic under-development Third-Worldism offers the only road to security by first guaranteeing economic security. There are, of course, many subdivisions, combinations and domestic alliances that blur the outlines of these basic alternatives.

In addition to these, a bilateral arrangement with the U.S or neutrality are among the alternatives. And as we said, the type of development will affect the selection. The future of the EC membership, the relations with the Central Asian Republic which may offer Turkey large market, or the success of Regional Development Organization are possible trends which will shape Turkey's future policies. All these attempts are related with Turkey's economic stability. Once Turkey gains it, it will be easier to determine the policies.

In general, despite the rapid and extensive changes in the security environment in which Turkey must operate, Turkey will continue to seek security through ties with NATO in the short run, and then the most economically profitable choice, which will provide Turkey's economic stability, will probably shape Turkey's security policy.

## APPENDIX

**Figure 1**



Source: *The Strategy Process*, Mintzberg, Henry and Quinn, James B., 1991.

**Table 1a.**  
**Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures**  
**and Population, 1970-1979, by Region, Organization, and Country**

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME) MILLION \$*		ARMED FORCES 1000	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP) MILLION \$*		CNTRL GOVT EXPEND (CGE) MILLION \$*	PEOPLE MILLION	ME/GNP	ME/CGE	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	CURRENT	CONST. 1978		CURRENT	CONST. 1978	CONST. 1978						
TURKEY												
1970	811	1343	540	19230	31825	6589	35.7	4.2	20.4	37	15.1	861
1971	961	1545	610	22274	35074	8122	36.6	4.4	19.0	42	16.7	958
1972	1030	1559	610	24920	37668	7403	37.5	4.1	21.1	41	16.3	1005
1973	1092	1562	545	27747	39893	7866	38.5	3.9	19.9	40	14.2	1031
1974	1209	1580	535	32621	42637	7936	39.5	3.7	19.9	40	13.5	1079
1975	2175	2594	453	38592	46038	9958	40.5	5.6	25.1	64	11.2	1136
1976	2852	3010	460	43668	49565	11577	41.5	6.1	26.0	72	11.1	1194
1977	2755	2949	540	48152	51545	14204	42.2	5.7	20.8	69	12.7	1212
1978	2727	2727	566	53060	53066	14249	43.5	5.1	19.1	62	13.0	1220
1979	2511	2307	717	58172	53448	14923	44.6	4.3	15.5	51	16.1	1196

**Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1970-1979,  
By Region, Organization, and Country**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS MILLION DOLLARS		ARMS EXPORTS MILLION DOLLARS		TOTAL IMPORTS MILLION DOLLARS		TOTAL EXPORTS MILLION DOLLARS		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	CURRENT	CONST. 1978	CURRENT	CONST. 1978	CURRENT	CONST. 1978	CURRENT	CONST. 1978		
TURKEY										
1970	250	413	5	8	948	1566	588	973	26.3	0.9
1971	260	409	0	0	1171	1843	677	1066	22.2	0.0
1972	150	226	10	15	1563	2363	885	1336	9.5	1.1
1973	50	71	10	14	2086	2984	1317	1864	2.3	0.6
1974	150	196	0	0	3778	4937	1532	2002	3.9	0.0
1975	220	262	5	6	4739	5653	1401	1671	4.6	0.4
1976	320	363	10	11	5129	5821	1960	2224	6.2	0.5
1977	140	149	0	0	5796	6204	1753	1876	2.4	0.0
1978	220	220	10	10	4600	4600	2266	2266	4.7	0.4
1979	210	192	10	9	5070	4658	2261	2077	4.1	0.4

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, (yearly publications)

**Table 1b.**  
**Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP, Central Government Expenditures**  
**and Population, 1977-1987, by Region, Organization, and Country**

YEAR	MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME) MILLION \$*		ARMED FORCES 1000	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP) MILLION \$*		CNTRL GOVT EXPEND (CGE) MILLION \$*	PEOPLE MILLION	ME/GNP	ME/CGE	ME PER CAPITA	ARMED FORCES PER 1000 PEOPLE	GNP PER CAPITA
	CURRENT	CONST. 1987		CURRENT	CONST. 1987	CONST. 1987						
TURKEY												
1977	1494	2612	771	24710	44960	12580	42.4	5.8	20.8	62	18.2	1060
1978	1485	2419	721	26340	46170	12640	43.3	5.2	19.1	56	16.6	1066
1979	1333	1998	688	30380	45500	13580	44.2	4.4	14.7	45	15.8	1029
1980	1568	2153	717	32750	44960	11840	45.1	4.8	18.2	48	15.9	996
1981	1866	2337	741	37280	46690	11670	46.2	5.0	20.0	51	16.0	1011
1982	2221	2613	769	41550	48890	12110	47.03	5.3	21.6	55	16.3	1034
1983	2223	2518	824	44720	50660	12630	48.4	5.0	19.9	52	17.0	1047
1984	2227	2432	815	49040	53580	13820	49.5	4.5	17.6	40	16.5	1062
1985	2448	2597	814	53250	56480	14480	50.7	4.6	17.9	51	16.1	1115
1987	2690	2890	879	65460	85460	14920	53.0	4.4	19.4	55	16.6	1235

**Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1977-1987,  
By Region, Organization, and Country**

YEAR	ARMS IMPORTS MILLION DOLLARS		ARMS EXPORTS MILLION DOLLARS		TOTAL IMPORTS MILLION DOLLARS		TOTAL EXPORTS MILLION DOLLARS		ARMS IMPORTS TOTAL IMPORTS	% %	ARMS EXPORTS TOTAL EXPORTS
	CURRENT	CONST. 1987	CURRENT	CONST. 1987	CURRENT	CONST. 1987	CURRENT	CONST. 1987			
TURKEY											
1977	140	245	0	0	5795	10140	1753	3056	2.4	0	
1978	220	358	10	16	4599	7493	2288	3728	4.8	0.4	
1979	170	256	10	15	5060	7502	2261	3386	3.4	0.4	
1980	300	412	10	14	7900	10880	2910	3995	3.8	0.3	
1981	310	368	10	13	6933	11190	4703	5800	3.5	0.2	
1982	450	530	20	24	8843	10410	5746	6761	5.1	0.3	
1983	500	566	90	102	9232	10460	5728	6489	5.4	1.6	
1984	490	535	160	175	10730	11720	7134	7792	4.6	2.2	
1985	440	467	100	106	11030	11700	7958	8440	4.0	1.3	
1986	600	620	0	0	11030	11380	7466	7711	5.4	0	
1987	925	925	10	10	13270	13270	10190	10190	7.0	0.1	

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, (yearly publications)

**Table 2.**  
**Total Active Duty Military Manpower**  
**(Thousands)**  
**(Including Spain)**

	1971			1988			Total % Ch.		
		% of NATO & Japan Total	% of NATO Total	Rank		% of NATO & Japan Total	% of NATO Total	Rank	71 vs 88
<b>Belgium</b>	106.8	1.6%	1.7%	12	110.0	1.8%	1.9%	10	+3
<b>Canada</b>	86.9	1.3%	1.4%	13	87.6	1.4%	1.5%	13	+0
<b>Denmark</b>	44.5	0.7%	0.7%	14	29.8	0.5%	0.5%	15	-32
<b>France</b>	568.3	8.6%	8.9%	3	557.9	9.1%	9.5%	3	-2
<b>Germany</b>	472.0	7.1%	7.4%	5	495.0	8.1%	8.4%	4	+4
<b>Greece</b>	178.7	2.7%	2.8%	10	199.3	3.2%	3.4%	9	+11
<b>Italy</b>	526.0	8.0%	8.3%	4	446.2	7.3%	7.6%	5	-15
<b>Luxembourg</b>	1.1	0.0%	0.0%	16	1.3	0.0%	0.0%	16	+19
<b>Netherlands</b>	113.0	1.7%	1.8%	11	106.7	1.7%	1.8%	11	-5
<b>Norway</b>	36.3	0.5%	0.6%	15	40.2	0.7%	0.7%	14	+10
<b>Portugal</b>	244.2	3.7%	3.8%	8	103.7	1.7%	1.8%	12	-57
<b>Spain</b>	282.2	4.3%	4.4%	7	303.9	4.9%	5.2%	7	+7
<b>Turkey</b>	614.5	9.3%	9.6%	2	847.1	13.8%	14.4%	2	+37
<b>UK</b>	384.0	5.8%	6.0%	6	323.7	5.3%	5.5%	6	-15
<b>US</b>	2714.0	41.4%	42.6%	1	2246.0	36.5%	38.1%	1	-17
<b>Japan</b>	234.3	3.5%		9	247.2	4.0%		8	+5

Source: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, 1990.

Table 3.

<b>Years</b>	<b>Population (m)</b>	<b>GNP Real Growth (%)</b>	<b>GNP per Capita (\$)</b>	<b>Inflation (%)</b>	<b>Unemployment (%)</b>
1981	45.8	4.7	963	37.6	14.2
1982	46.8	4.3	997	32.7	15.0
1983	47.8	4.1	1010	30.5	16.1
1984	48.3	5.9	1035	50.3	16.5
1985	49.3	5.1	1080	45.0	16.5
1986	50.3	8.1	1159	34.8	15.5
1987	51.4	7.4	1325	38.9	15.2
1988	52.4	3.4	1342	75.4	14.0

Source: The Middle East Review, 1981-1989

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